UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA
SCHOOL OF LAW
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES
Paper No. 2014-09

February 2014

REGULATION BY HYPOTHETICAL
MEHRSA BARADARAN
Assistant Professor of Law
University of Georgia School of Law
mehrsa@uga.edu

67 Vanderbilt Law Review 1247 (2014).

This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network electronic library at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2402201

Electroniccopy
copy available
available at:
Electronic
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2402201
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2402201

1 - Baradaran_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

10/7/2014 12:15 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

___________________________________________________________
VOLUME 67

OCTOBER 2014

NUMBER 5

___________________________________________________________

ARTICLES
Regulation by Hypothetical
Mehrsa Baradaran*
A new paradigm is afoot in banking regulation—and it involves a turn
toward the more speculative. Previous regulatory instruments have included
geographic restrictions, activity restrictions, disclosure mandates, capital
requirements, and risk management oversight to ensure the safety of the
banking system. This Article describes and contextualizes these regulatory
tools and shows how and why they were formed to deal with industry change.
The financial crisis of 2008 exposed the shortcomings in each of these regimes.
In important ways, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) departs from these past regimes and proposes something
new: Call it “Regulation by Hypothetical.”
Regulation by hypothetical refers to rules duly promulgated under
appropriate statutory and regulatory mechanisms that require banks and their
regulators today to make predictions about sources of crisis and weakness
tomorrow. Those predictions—which, by their very definition, are conjectural
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and speculative, even hypothetical—then become the basis of the use of the
state’s regulatory power. This Article discusses two prominent instances of
regulation by hypothetical: stress tests and living wills. It then discusses the
strengths and weaknesses of such a regime and describes how the reliance on
regulation by hypothetical can exacerbate the practice of government
sponsorship of private financial risk taking. The Article then provides a
solution that would strengthen this regime: using financial war games to
increase the predictive value of the hypothetical scenarios.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The history of banking regulation in the United States
resembles a cat-and-mouse game of industry change followed by
regulatory response. Often, a crisis or industry innovation leads to a
new regulatory regime. Regulatory initiatives have included
geographic restrictions, activity restrictions, disclosure mandates,
capital requirements, and risk management rules. 1 The recently
enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), which was a response to the recent financial
crisis, introduces yet another strain of banking industry supervision:
regulation by hypothetical. Regulation by hypothetical refers to rules
that require banks today to make predictions about crises and
weaknesses tomorrow. Those predictions—which, by definition, are
speculative—then become the basis for regulatory intervention.
This Article discusses two prominent instances of regulation by
hypothetical: stress tests and living wills. Both of these forms of
regulation were codified in Dodd-Frank, and they are two of the pillars
supporting Dodd-Frank’s attempt to manage risk in systemically
important financial institutions (“SIFIs”). 2 This Article will examine
both the origins and the evolution of these reforms. It will also discuss
the strengths and weaknesses of regulation by hypothetical and
describe how reliance on this regulatory tool can exacerbate
governmental sponsorship of private financial risk taking. Ultimately,
1.
Most of these initiatives followed the banking industry’s growth after the Great
Depression. See infra Part II.
2.
See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a), (d) & (i) (2012).
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this Article concludes that the regulation by hypothetical regime must
be either abandoned or strengthened because its current form has
significant flaws.
Regulation by hypothetical adopts and extends the risk
management framework used by firms for decades. That framework
uses mathematical models to capture risk exposure in an increasingly
complex financial landscape. What distinguishes regulation by
hypothetical from prior risk management practices is that banks now
must adhere to a governmentally imposed system of regulation that is
both derived from and centered on hypothetical risk modeling.3
The motivations of regulation by hypothetical are contagion
containment, prophylaxis, and building partnerships between public
regulators and private institutions to stay ahead of crises before they
develop. 4 Part of the reason the risk management regime failed is that
individual firm models could not account for scenarios that might
cripple the entire financial market and cause systemic risk, such as a
nationwide decline in housing prices. 5 In theory, regulation by
hypothetical addresses this problem by streamlining risk modeling
and bringing it in-house to banking regulators, specifically the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve (“FRB”). This new top-down risk
modeling structure assures that systemic risk will be detected more
easily, addressed more consistently, and modeled more rigorously than
by shortsighted and insular private firms. 6 In sum, Dodd-Frank
endorses this risk management regime, mandates adherence to it, and
enlarges the government’s role in its implementation.
There are three significant problems with regulation by
hypothetical as it is currently envisioned and practiced through stress
testing and living wills. First, most scholars and regulatory bodies
have concluded that risk management led by banks was a failure. 7 If
the risk management framework failed, as some say, because firms did
not consider risks that were severe enough, then hypothetical
regulation could provide an antidote by compelling banks to consider
more severe scenarios of economic failure. However, if the risk
management regime failed because it was based on a faulty premise
3.
4.

See infra Part III.
For more on the way that Dodd-Frank entrenches a public-private partnership, see
DAVID A. SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS
(UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 79 (2011).
5.
Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir. Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Why Banks Failed the
Stress Test, Address at the Marcus-Evans Conference on Stress-Testing (Feb. 9–10, 2009),
available at www.bis.org/review/r090219d.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X3YR-5AKK.
6.
See infra Part III.A.
7.
See infra Part III.A.
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that it is possible to imagine and prepare for every adverse scenario
that might affect a firm in the future, then any regulations relying on
hypotheticals are doomed from the start. In other words, insofar as the
risk management regime was predicated on the assumption that
modeling for risk was an effective way of containing it, and the regime
failed to account for unprecedented events (such as a nationwide
plummeting of housing prices), the hypothetical regime is similarly
limited. Ex ante hypotheticals are inherently unable to account for
unprecedented events. 8 Regulations based on hypotheticals are thus
built on a precarious foundation.
Second, the FRB, the creator and administrator of mandated
hypothetical testing, comes to the project with a conflict of interest. 9
The FRB has always been a systemic risk regulator, and Dodd-Frank
emphasizes and strengthens that function of the FRB. 10 But the FRB
is also tasked with ensuring calm and vibrant markets.11 Therefore, if
the FRB creates a stress test that is too difficult and firms are not able
to withstand the pressure, markets may panic. On the other hand, if
the FRB creates a “soft” stress test in order to reassure markets about
bank safety, systemic risks may well go unaddressed. 12 This is not a
theoretical problem. It was apparent during the first round of stress
testing in 2009 that the FRB was more interested in calming
markets. 13 As a result, many knowledgeable observers accused the
FRB of conducting a very light stress test and giving all of the firms a

8.
See infra Part III.D.1.
9.
This specific conflict only applies to stress testing. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation administers living wills.
10. Dodd-Frank strengthens the Federal Reserve’s role as systemic risk regulator not only
through mandated stress testing, but also through the creation of the Federal Systemic Oversight
Counsel. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321–5333 (2012).
11. See THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS (9th ed. 2005), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/98F-E3UV (stating
that the Federal Reserve should seek "to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment,
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates” because “when prices are stable . . . the
prices of goods, services, materials and labor . . . serve as clearer signals and guides to the efficient
allocation of resources and thus contribute to a higher standard of living.”); What is the Purpose
of the Federal Reserve System?, THE FEDERAL RESERVE (Feb. 4, 2014), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12594.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/RPZ9-U85Z (stating
that the purpose of the Federal Reserve is “[m]aintaining the stability of the financial system and
containing systemic risk that may arise in financial markets.”).
12. Mark S. Copelovitch & David A. Singer, Financial Regulation, Monetary Policy, and
Inflation in the Industrialized, World 70 J. POL. 663 (2008)
in 23 industrial
countries with central banks that are vested with bank regulatory responsibility.”).
13. See infra Part III.D.1.a.
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clean bill of health. 14 The FRB then publicized the results, which
predictably caused a boost in the stock prices of the stress-tested
banks, as well as a general surge of market confidence. 15
This market effect of regulator-conducted stress testing leads
to the third problem with regulating by hypothetical, which focuses on
the flip side of the FRB conflict. When the government conducts what
it claims to be a rigorous stress test of a bank and then gives that bank
a clean bill of health, the market receives a signal not only that the
bank’s risks are well managed but also that the government itself will
stand behind the bank if the assessment proves incorrect. Whereas
individual firms used faulty risk management modeling in the preDodd-Frank era to inform their investment strategies, regulation by
hypothetical has a game-changing quality. Regulators are now using
models to reassure markets of firm strength, thereby providing a
stamp of approval that could lead to unjustifiable reliance by markets.
The federal government has already been accused of oversubsidizing
large banks by providing below-market funding, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) insurance, and implicit bailout
protection of firms deemed too big to fail (“TBTF”). 16 This new regime
creates another federal subsidy to the largest banks—a market signal
that certifies the health of these firms. If the hypotheticals were
accurate and the stress testing rigorous, this might not be that
troublesome. But as this paper demonstrates, these hypothetical tests
are not accurate barometers of bank health. In fact, the regulatory
stamp of approval more likely has the effect of lulling markets into
complacency and suppressing more rigorous analysis of the largest
firms. It may also increase the likelihood of these firms being bailed
out again in the event of a disaster because counterparties can claim
that reliance on FRB pronouncements led them to invest in unsafe
banks. In the end, regulation by hypothetical functions as an implicit
guarantee by regulatory bodies of the largest banks. This guarantee,
based on limited hypothetical scenarios, gives rise to perhaps the most
troubling aspect of regulation by hypothetical.
Thus, regulating by hypothetical and its problematic market
signaling further entrenches a flawed partnership of the nation’s
banks with the federal government. If regulators are going to continue
14. See infra Part III.D.1.a.
15. See infra notes 158–60 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Parts II.F.1 & III.D.1.c; see also Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value,
Caution, and Accountability in an Era of Large Banks and Complex Finance, 31 REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 765, 827–31 (2012) (detailing various public subsidies); Ann Graham, Bringing to Hell the
Elephants in the Economy: The Case for Ending “Too Big to Fail,” 8 PIERCE L. REV. 117, 118
(2010) (identifying specific banks that are “too big to fail,” and describing their characteristics).
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to mandate hypothetical regulation, they must insist on aggressive
risk modeling. One such tool would involve borrowing from military
war game modeling to accurately predict crisis responses. The military
has long engaged in “war games,” or realistic simulations of a potential
conflict, to prepare themselves for the actual military event. The
premise of military war games is that the best way to prepare for the
unknowns of war is to practice responses to different possible
scenarios. The current hypotheticals only look at balance sheets at a
static point in time and do not attempt to predict how firm
management might react to specific market events. 17 For example, in
predicting systemic risk, it would be relevant to know whether a fund
manager faced with a stock market loss would try to prevent further
loss, double down on risk in order to try to recuperate losses, or attempt
to hedge to account for the loss. All of these responses would implicate
different parts of the financial market as well as different
counterparties. An accurate war game scenario accounts for all of these
possibilities. 18
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II offers a brief survey of
financial regulation generally, describing the broad policy goals of
financial and banking regulation since the Great Depression in order
to provide context for the regulation by hypothetical regime. Part III
explains regulation by hypothetical as a creation of Dodd-Frank and
explains in greater detail stress tests and living wills as instances of
such regulation. Part III also describes the inherent weaknesses of
these forms of regulation, including the ways in which hypothetical
financial regulation offers an implicit governmental guarantee against
risks not covered by such hypotheticals. Part IV then discusses how
hypothetical financial regulation can be improved. Specifically, Part IV
suggests modeling financial war games, in keeping with practices long
followed by military and intelligence regimes.
II. FINANCIAL REGULATION SINCE THE GREAT DEPRESSION
Bank regulation since the Great Depression has taken five
major forms: geographic restrictions, activity restrictions, capital or
equity requirements, disclosure mandates, and risk management
oversight. These regimes have been employed successively and in
tandem to combat new problems and to make use of technological

17. Robert F. Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98
MINN. L. REV. 2236, 2260–68 (describing static risk models and the potential application of war
games).
18. Id. at 2263–66.
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innovation in modernizing regulatory tools. This Part will briefly
outline the strains of banking regulation since the Great Depression.
This historical account highlights that banking regulation has
undergone significant change in the last one hundred years. It also
reveals how banking regulation gradually responded to new
developments in the industry. Today, once again, the banking industry
is facing transformative change. And, as in the past, major shifts in
bank regulation are in the offing. Many industry analysts wish to
revive old forms of regulation, while others advocate novel approaches
to address new risks posed by an increasingly complex banking
environment. Layered on top of this debate is Dodd-Frank, which has
put in place a new strain of banking regulation: regulation by
hypothetical. While other forms of banking regulation have been
reexamined, regulation by hypothetical is a new form of government
control that has been added to the mix of regulatory tools. It remains
to be seen how prominent a role these new forms of regulation will play
in both the near- and long-term. But one thing is certain: regulation by
hypothetical—like past approaches to bank regulation—raises
profound questions about the proper mix of private and public power
in the financial industry. Table 1 identifies and briefly describes the
six key forms of bank regulation:
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disclosure of
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exposures, or firm
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Mandating
minimum capital
requirements in
order to reduce
incentive for risk
taking as well as
providing a buffer
for failure

Federal Reserve
“R” ratings

SEC and FINRA
disclosure
regimes
FDIA disclosure re:
holdings of
managers 20

CAMELS

Oversight and
monitoring of
internal risk
modeling and
external modeling
of risk exposures of
firms or product
lines

Risk Management

Sarbanes-Oxley

Relying on market
discipline

Disclosure 19

Capital /Equity

Living Wills

Stress Tests

Using hypothetical
future scenarios to
inform ex ante
regulation

Hypothetical
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19. The SEC disclosure regime only applies to publically traded commercial banks and investment banks. Currently, all the U.S. SIFIs are publically traded and therefore
subject to the SEC disclosure regime.
20. DeNaples v. OCC, 706 F.3d 481, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

Volcker
Rule/narrow
banking

Bank Holding
Company Act

Imposing interest
rate caps and
lending limits.
Glass-Steagall
Act

Siloing risky
activities from
commercial
banking

Separating
traditional
banking functions
from more risky
commercial
ventures

Activity
Restrictions

2014]

Douglas
Amendment
geographic
restrictions
repealed by the
Riegle-Neal
Interstate
Branching Act of
1994)

Unit banking and
prohibiting banks
from interstate
branching in
order to prevent
excessive
concentrations in
banking

Basic definition
and aims of
regulation

Geographic
Restrictions
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These different forms of regulation have marked particular
historical periods, as Figure 1 indicates:
Figure 1: Timeline of Regulatory Regimes
1933

1970

1980

1994

2009

2013

Activity Restrictions
Geographic Restrictions
Disclosure
U.S. Capital Requirements
Risk Management
Hypothetical

These different forms of regulation arose in different periods as
a result of major changes in the banking industry. The remainder of
this Part recounts the impetus behind each regulatory device, thus
setting the stage for a close look at recent changes in the banking
industry and the resulting emergence of regulation by hypothetical.
A. Geographic Restrictions
In the United States, bank branching across state lines is a
relatively recent phenomenon. Unit banking, or single-branch
banking, was one of the major tenets of early banking regulation. 21
Banks were permitted to operate only out of a single branch so as to
prohibit concentrations of power. But this approach also caused
inefficiencies by impeding economies of scale; in addition, banks were
unable to protect against risk through diversification because each
institution’s fate was tied to the economic condition of a single region. 22
Eventually, banks were permitted to merge with other branches in
order to move their funds efficiently across regions. 23 However, even
then, banks, including national banks, were prohibited from crossing

21. Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. BANKING INST.
221, 231 (2000).
22. Id. at 232.
23. FED. COMM. ON BRANCH, GRP. & CHAIN BANKING, BRANCH BANKING IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (1930), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/federal%20reserve%20
history/frcom_br_gp_ch_banking/branch_banking_us.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8FWZ8N5A.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2402201

1 - Baradaran_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2014]

10/17/2014 3:31 PM

REGULATION BY HYPOTHETICAL

1257

state lines. 24 This prohibition was lifted in 1994 through the RiegleNeal Interstate Branching Act. 25
The justification for geographic restrictions hearkens back to
the views that marked the founding era, including those of Thomas
Jefferson. Jefferson and others deeply feared excessive power and
concentration in banking. 26 They worried that, if banks became too
large, then the money centers—such as New York, Philadelphia, and
Boston—would endanger America’s budding democratic movement,
which had its roots in local civic engagement. 27 Unit banking, which
prohibits banks to have more than one branch, was thus entrenched in
banking regulation from its start and proved difficult to lift for nearly
a century. 28
These restrictions were gradually weakened due to
industrialization forces and economic pressure. The Great Depression
dealt the first blow to geographic restrictions. Many small, rural banks
failed as the nation became more urban and as agricultural
strongholds were weakened. 29 The McFadden Act, passed in 1927,
allowed banks to branch within state lines so that rural banks could

24. Randall S. Kroszner, The Motivations Behind Banking Reform, 24 REGULATION 36, 37
(2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=272796, archived at
http://perma.cc/CEY7-SKQ2.
25. Id.
26. John S. Gordon, A Short Banking History of the United States, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10,
2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122360636585322023.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
A8GP-WS5H.
27. Thomas Jefferson once observed:
Can it be thought that the Constitution intended that for a shade or two of
convenience, more or less, Congress should be authorized to break down the most
ancient and fundamental laws of the several States . . . . Nothing but a necessity
invincible by any other means, can justify such a prostitution of laws, which constitute
the pillars of our whole system of jurisprudence.
Jefferson's Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank: 1791, YALE LAW SCHOOL, LILLIAN
GOLDMAN LAW LIBRARY, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/bank-tj.asp, archived at http://
perma.cc/YLJ3-A6UT (last visited Sept. 25, 2014).
28. Once expectations were set, banks in smaller regions fought hard to keep geographic
restrictions intact so they could compete against bigger city banks, which had greater access to
funds and a greater ability to branch. The arguments for continuing geographic restrictions
focused on the practical problems caused by excessive concentrations in banking, such as
“reduced competition, impaired service quality, increased price, driving out local firms,
disadvantaging local areas, enabling a few large banks to amass inordinate economic power;
reducing local control over banking, politicizing the banking system, and heightening pressure to
bail out big banks that get into trouble.” RICHARD S. CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY
P. MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 178 (4th ed. 2008).
29. See David C. Wheelock, Regulation, Market Structure, and the Bank Failures of the
Great Depression, 77 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 27, 30 (1995), available at https://
research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/95/03/Regulation_Mar_Apr1995.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/W5BZ-6AX9.
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diversify their holdings. 30 These limits continued until advanced
technology again made them unsustainable. The final blow to
geographic restrictions was in 1994, after many years of banks trying
to circumvent the rules. The ATM was introduced in the United States
in the 1970s, which made it possible for bank customers to perform
transactions regardless of their bank’s location. 31 This innovation
coupled with increased bank mergers in the 1980s and 1990s led
policymakers to lift these now-outdated restrictions. The resulting
Riegle-Neal Act 32 was not forward thinking, but rather a reaction to
pressure from the industry and a recognition of the changing face of
banking. Banks needed to branch nationwide in order to exploit
economies of scale and allocate their resources efficiently by
diversifying their lending and deposit activities.
B. Activity Restrictions
The National Bank Acts (“NBA”) 33 of 1863 and 1864 included
the first set of nationally mandated activity restrictions. One such
restriction limited bank activities to those “incidental powers as shall
be necessary to carry on the business of banking,” 34 thus keeping banks

30. ABC’s of Banking: Lesson Five, CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF BANKING,
http://www.ct.gov/dob/cwp/view.asp?a=2235&q=297892, archived at http:// perma.cc/ZUL3-4E52
(last visited Aug. 11, 2014).
31. Kim Zetter, Sept. 2, 1969: First U.S. ATM Starts Doling Out Dollars, WIRED (Sept. 2,
2010, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/thisdayintech/2010/09/0902first-us-atm/, archived at
http://perma.cc/QY9K-PEG7.
32. See Joseph N. Heiney, Consolidation in the U.S. Banking Industry since Riegel-Neal, 9
J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 71, 71 (2011).
33. Regulation in the early days of banking was primarily a state matter. It consisted
mostly of charter restrictions—with states trying to keep unscrupulous individuals out of the
banking business. The NBA created a national banking system as well as a federal bank
regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) to regulate them. The purpose
of the first NBA and the newly formed national banks was to create a national currency that
would help the government fund the Civil War. The purpose of the second NBA was to create
federally chartered banks that would operate in addition to the banks chartered by the states.
See Matthew Jaremski, State Banks and the National Banking Acts: A Tale of Creative
Destruction, 45 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 379, 384 (2013); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY: A SHORT HISTORY 6 (2011), available at
http://www.occ.gov/about/what-we-do/history/OCC%20history%20final.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/5B88-28R6 (explaining that, while the second NBA permitted both the chartering of
new banks and the conversion of state banks into national ones, the first Comptroller of the
Currency “gave preference to the latter, convinced that experienced bank managers were
essential to the system’s success”).
34. Carl Felsenfeld, The Bank Holding Company Act: Has it Lived its Life?, 38 VILL. L. REV.
1, 48 (1993) (quoting National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, § 8, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988)).
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from engaging in commercial activities. 35 The Glass-Steagall Act, a
follow-up to the NBA, enforced comprehensive activity restrictions on
all national banks. The centerpiece of post–Great Depression reform
was the Glass-Steagall Act, 36 which prohibited banks from engaging in
a wide array of activities while also imposing interest rate caps and
lending limits. 37 These reforms separated riskier banking activities
(securities and insurance underwriting and propriety trading) from
traditional banking activity (deposit taking and lending) and
permitted banks to engage in only the latter.
In order to understand the need for activity restrictions, it is
important to understand the problems they were meant to address.
The central problem in banking was the prevalence of bank failures
and irrational runs. Often, banks viewed as overly risky were punished
by crude market discipline in the form of depositor runs.38 But runs
were painful, imprecise, and, more importantly, inefficient: often
healthy banks that were perceived as unhealthy, either through
association or rumor, would also be exposed to customer runs. 39 And
although many states had deposit insurance funds, the funds often
could not support large bank failures. 40
The inception of federal deposit insurance after the Great
Depression ended bank runs but introduced a major moral hazard
problem: because the insurance system shielded banks from market
punishment and catastrophic failure, it incentivized banks to take on
greater risks. With the initiation of the FDIC insurance fund, top-down
35. Id. The NBA also imposed credit limits and capital requirements—a bank could not lend
more than ten percent of its capital to any one customer. William B. Glidden, National Bank
Limits and the Comptroller’s Regs: A Clarification, 101 BANKING L.J. 430, 430 (1984). The Act
also required banks to maintain cash reserves at federally specified levels. Bruce L. Rockwood,
Interstate Banking and Nonbanking in America: A New Recipe for an Old Prescription or Why
Does the Elephant Banker Wear Tennis Shoes and Water Wings, and Carry an Economist Pocket
Diary?,12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 137, 149 (1989). The acts also created geographic restrictions for
banks that mostly mirrored those provided by the states. Jeffrey D. Dunn, Expansion of National
Bank Powers: Regulatory and Judicial Precedent Under the National Bank Act, Glass-Steagall
Act, and Bank Holding Company Act, 36 SW. L.J. 765, 768 (1982).
36. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162, repealed by Gramm-LeachBliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
37. Markham, supra note 21, at 237–38; see also Karen E. Klein, What Regulation Q’s Repeal
Means for Business Checking, BLOOMBERG (July 22, 2011), http:// www.businessweek.com/smallbusiness/what-regulation-qs-repeal-means-for-business-checking-07222011.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/BCH-3AYT (stating that Regulation Q “regulated interest rates on various bank
accounts, but it was whittled away by 1980s deregulation legislation”).
38. See RICHARD GROSSMAN, UNSETTLED ACCOUNT: THE EVOLUTION OF BANKING IN THE
INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD SINCE 1800 (2010).
39. Id.
40. Ricki Tigert Helfer, What Deposit Insurance Can and Cannot Do, 36 FIN. & DEV. 22, 22
(1999).
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and comprehensive federal regulation of banking started in earnest. 41
If the federal government was going to foot the bill for bank failures, it
was also going to make sure banks were behaving responsibly.
Glass-Steagall’s activity restrictions succeeded in keeping
banking crisis-free for nearly fifty years, 42 but this regulatory regime
also fell victim to significant change in the industry. These bright-line
restrictions could not be maintained without sacrificing the
profitability and competitiveness of the banking industry. By the
1990s, banking had become far more complex and international in
nature. 43 Further, many traditional banking functions had migrated
out of banks and into the capital markets with the development of
money market accounts. 44 Responding to these changes, regulators
abandoned the clear-cut lines of activity restrictions. This move has
recently been criticized, and many are calling for reinstituted “walls”
between “safe” banking functions, such as deposit taking and lending,
and “risky” banking functions, which now include derivatives trading
and the sale of an ever-expanding array of securitized products. 45
Proponents of activity restrictions argue that, from the 1930s
until the 1970s, this regime kept banks stable and safe with few bank
failures; it was not until regulators disregarded activity restrictions
that banks began to fail, turning the threat of repeated crises in
banking into a reality. 46 As it turns out, this account is accurate but
41. Although the NBA was the first comprehensive federal banking legislation, its purpose
was not to regulate banks or support them through deposit insurance.
42. Mehmet Hasan Eken et al., The Evolutions in Regulations in Banking: A Cycle Based
Approach, 2 ACRN J. FIN. & RISK PERSPECTIVES 15, 18 (2013).
43. See id. at 19 (“[T]he dismantlement of GSA was inevitable due to the fact that the
deregulation of banking industries in developed countries (mainly in Europe) had potentially
placed U.S. banks in a disadvantageous environment and left them uncompetitive.”); The Long
Demise of Glass-Steagall, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/wallstreet/
weill/demise.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WTC6-B8Z8 (“One reason Greenspan favor[ed]
greater deregulation [was] to help U.S. banks compete with foreign institutions.”).
44. The Long Demise of Glass-Steagall, supra note 43.
45. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-ToFail Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 707, 747-79 (2010); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Narrow
Banking: An Overdue Reform That Could Solve the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem and Align US and
UK Financial Regulation of Financial Conglomerates (Part 1), 31 No. 3 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES
POL’Y REP. 1, 15–19 (2012) (stating that Dodd-Frank did not implement a regulatory regime that
would correct the risk exposure of banks from risky nonbanking activities).
46. See Terry Carter, How Lawyers Enabled the Meltdown and How They Might Have
Prevented It, 95 A.B.A. J. 34, 35 (2009) (stating that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act created a new
regulatory regime that allowed banks to partake in the same activities as brokerage firms and
investment bankers, which lead to increased risk taking by banks and contributed to the financial
meltdown); Richard Grossman, U.S. Banking History, Civil War to World War II, EH.NET (March
16, 2008), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/us-banking-history-civil-war-to-world-war-ii/, archived at
http://perma.cc/8B9J-BKEX (“For example, several court decisions, along with the Financial
Services Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) of 1999, have blurred the previously strict
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too simplistic. Well before activity restrictions were officially lifted by
regulators, banks were finding ways around them. 47 Banks claimed
that changes in banking were incompatible with outdated
restrictions. 48 In other words, the lifting of activity restrictions was not
a forward-looking move but rather a regulatory response to a new
reality in banking. By the 1970s, U.S. banks could claim, with good
reason, that they could not compete with foreign banks or the private
securities firms without being permitted to offer increased services,
diversify their investment products, and access higher-profit markets
to offset interest rate losses.
Recent years have seen a renewed interest in activity
restrictions. 49 The Volcker Rule calls for restrictions that would
separate higher-risk activities from traditional banking activities. 50
The wisdom of the Volcker Rule and other modernized forms of activity
restrictions is beyond the scope of this Article. Rising pressures for its
adoption, however, illustrate how banking law continues to evolve in
response to crisis—in this case, the financial crisis of 2008.
C. The Shift: From Bright-Line to Market-Driven Regulation
For many years, banks were primarily engaged in lending and
deposit taking, and they had a monopoly in the consumer and
corporate credit markets. Activity and geographic restrictions were
well suited to this era of simple banking. During the 1970s and 1980s,
banking changed fundamentally due to competition from the capital
markets, increased technology, and the globalization of finance. As
banking became more complex, banking regulation changed. The clear
separations between banking and commerce eroded, and bright-line
regulatory rules were discarded in favor of more nuanced,
discretionary, market-driven models. Both regulators and banks
separation between different financial service industries (particularly, although not limited to
commercial and investment banking).”); see also CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 28, at
27 (arguing that “the once formidable wall between commercial and investment banking fell after
a long bombardment”).
47. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to
the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 987 (2011); see The Long Demise of GlassSteagall, supra note 43 (explaining the various ways in which the Federal Reserve Board
interpreted the Glass-Steagall Act to allow previously prohibited activities).
48. Corinne Crawford, The Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and the Current Financial
Crisis, 9 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 127, 128 (2011).
49. David Cho & Binyamin Appelbaum, Obama’s ‘Volcker Rule’ Shifts Power Away from
Geithner, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/01/21/AR2010012104935.html, archived at http://perma.cc/BV45-B9AD.
50. Id. Advocates for renewed activity restrictions have also suggested breaking up the
banks. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 47, at 987.
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favored these shifts because the deployment of new regulatory tools—
such as disclosure rules, capital requirements, and risk management
modeling—involved fewer regulatory intrusions and greater freedom
for banks to compete in the financial industry. Regulators, who were
unable to keep up with the complexity of the market also preferred
market-centered regimes that allowed banking counterparties and the
banks themselves to evaluate risk.
D. Disclosure
The premise of the disclosure regulatory regime is that
regulators must enforce the frequent dissemination of material facts
about publically traded companies so that the market can accurately
gauge the price of its securities. Disclosure facilitates market
discipline, which in turn protects investors. However, unlike securities
regulators, banking regulators historically have not embraced
disclosure as a primary regulatory tool. Because of banks’
susceptibility to runs and their extreme need for consumer trust, bank
regulators gave them “special treatment” and did not force them to
disclose their vulnerabilities so as to prevent “an irrational public
response leading to runs on banks.” 51 Confidentiality, rather than
disclosure, was used as a way to shield banks from instability. Thus,
the regulatory regime sought to maintain public confidence in banks
by keeping information about their condition confidential. 52 The
emphasis on confidentiality in banking regulation after the Depression
was perhaps “most tellingly revealed by the exclusion of banks from
the . . . mandatory disclosure regime implemented by the Securities
Act of 1933 . . . and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.” 53 Ironically,
these reforms were initially enacted to respond to the misdeeds of the
banking industry. 54
51. Laurie Durcan & Bruce K. Riordan, Banking Disclosures, Financial Privacy, and the
Public Interest, 6 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 391, 395 (1987).
52. Id. at 400.
53. Robert P. Bartlett, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. REV. 293, 307 (2012). Most
of today’s large TBTF banks were formerly investment banks that used to be held as
partnerships. Starting in the 1970s and ending in the mid-1990s, these commercial banks and
investment banks went public in waves. Once they did, the disclosure regimes attached to most
large banks that were not already public entities.
54. See generally MICHAEL PERINO, THE HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET: HOW FERDINAND
PECORA’S INVESTIGATION OF THE GREAT CRASH FOREVER CHANGED AMERICAN FINANCE (2010).
Investigations immediately following the Great Depression focused on short sellers and other
market operators. Id. at 129. When Ferdinand Pecora took over these investigations into the
Great Crash, he changed the focus of the investigation. Id. Pecora “for the first time . . . showed
commercial bankers engaged in a reckless grab for profits that pushed hard on the boundaries of
legal behavior.” Id. For instance, compensation practices for officers “provided an incentive for
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Historically, banks were forced to disclose information to their
regulators, but this information, referred to as “call reports,” was kept
confidential. 55 In 1972, the FDIC made these call reports publicly
available due to increasing bank failures and the growing notion that
market devices could discipline banks along with activity
restrictions. 56 As the banking market became increasingly deregulated
and traditional “command and control” banking regulation became
unpopular, market discipline was increasingly seen as a key pillar of
bank oversight. Increased disclosure, it was thought, would lead to
market discipline, which would make command-and-control regulation
less necessary. 57 During this time, the FDIC, OCC, and FRB moved
toward requiring increased disclosure in banks’ annual financial
statements. 58 Congress gave these regulators increased enforcement
excessive risk taking,” causing officers to “focus on short-term profits, not long term
performance.” Id at 146–47. These compensation practices incentivized officers to sell risky
securities without adequately informing the public about these securities; rather, officers advised
the public to rely on the incomplete information provided by the banks. Id at 152. Pecora showed
that this problem permeated the banking industry, from the smaller banks all the way to “the
top of the banking structure.” Id at 219. It was Pecora’s belief that “the absence of any regulations
requiring disclosures to shareholders and investors” was one of the main culprits of that period’s
financial woes. Id at 272. After the investigation, and “[w]ith Pecora still keeping pressure on
Wall Street,” Congress passed a securities bill with the idea that “[n]ew securities could now only
be sold if investors were given all the information they needed to make an informed decision
about whether to buy them.” Id at 287–88.
55. Alfred D. Mathewson, From Confidential Supervision to Market Discipline: The Role of
Disclosure in the Regulation of Commercial Banks, 11 J. CORP. L. 139, 143 (1986). The
examination “[reviewed] all of the operations of the bank, including loan practices, trust
operations, internal control, checking and savings accounts, data processing, internal security,
and personnel practices.” Id.
56. Bartlett, supra note 53, at 309.
57. Id. at 304–05. (“In light of these events, it was generally believed that market
participants could potentially provide an important ally in bank oversight.”). Publicly available
call reports were revised at this time “to increase the information available about a bank’s loan
portfolio.” Id. at 309. Additionally, in 1983, “[m]assive payment defaults on international loans
encouraged Congress to pass the Lending Supervision Act” which “requires all banks and bank
holding companies to publically disclose any material concentrations of loan exposure in foreign
countries” quarterly to the regulators. Durcan & Riordan, supra note 51, at 398. In the late 1980s,
“the FDIC initiated a program for the commercial publication, on a quarterly basis, of redacted
decisions of the FDIC Board of Directors (removing identities of banks and other parties) and the
accompanying decisions of the administrative law judges issued in formal enforcement
adjudications.” Michael P. Malloy, Public Disclosure as a Tool of Federal Bank Regulation, 9 ANN.
REV. BANKING L. 229, 236 (1990).
58. Id. at 236–40. Banks’ financial statements were to be available to “security holders,
depositors, and anyone who [requested]” them. 12 C.F.R. § 18.1(a) (1989). For banks regulated by
the FDIC, the report was to include:
(i) a fair presentation of the bank's financial condition at the end of that year and the
preceding year; (ii) the results of operations for each such year; (iii) other information
that the FDIC may require of a particular bank; and (iv) a specified disclaimer to the
effect that “[t]his statement has not been reviewed, or confirmed for accuracy or
relevance, by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.”
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power to administer the sections of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts
(“SEC Acts”) that applied to banks. 59 Further, in 1964, Congress
subjected companies with greater than five hundred shareholders and
$1 million of assets to the mandatory disclosure requirements of the
Exchange Act. Congress delegated enforcement powers to the FDIC,
OCC, and FRB. These legislative changes ended the “three-decade
exemption of many banks from federal periodic disclosure obligations.”
In addition to government intervention, industry evolution
contributed to greater information sharing by banks. Most
significantly, the 1970s and 1980s saw a surge of banks going public,
thereby triggering quarterly public disclosure obligations under the
SEC Acts. 60
However, despite the move toward more disclosure, bank
regulators continued to give banks special protection from the usual
rules of corporate openness. For example, the results of regularly
conducted bank examinations of banks, which result in a rating system
referred to as CAMELS, are confidential and immune from even
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests. 61

Malloy, supra note 57, at 243 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 350.4). The OCC and FRB reports were
substantially identical. Id.
59. “Congressional concern in 1964 with the volume of OTC trading in the shares of banks
and other nonlisted companies ultimately prompted Congress to subject any company with
greater than 500 shareholders of record and $1 million of assets to the mandatory disclosure
requirements of the Exchange Act,” ending the “three-decade exemption of many banks from
federal periodic disclosure obligations.” Bartlett, supra note 53, at 308. The amendment also
delegated enforcement powers to the agencies (FDIC, OCC, FRB) that already regulated banks.
Thus, “[s]ince 1964, the banking regulators also enforced the periodic reporting and proxy
requirements of the Exchange Act pertaining to publicly traded banks under their supervision.”
David G. Oedel, Civil Liability for the Concealment of Bank Trouble, 6 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 443,
446 (1987).
60. Steven M. Davidoff, Did Going Public Spoil the Banks?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2008),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C03E7DF1639F931A1575BC0A96E9C8B63,
archived at http://perma.cc/BB3N-BTQQ. The Securities Act of 1933 was centered around the
idea of disclosure with the purpose of better informing investors on their sales and purchases of
securities. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 focused on the registration and regulation of
securities exchanges, or, in other words, the secondary trading of securities between persons
unrelated to the insurer. The 1934 Act also targeted brokers and dealers and implemented broad
antifraud and antimanipulation standards. Sections 12, 13, and 14 of the 1934 Act incorporates
standards for continuous registration, annual and periodic reports, and stockholder proxy
solicitation disclosures for companies whose securities are already in public hands.
61. FDIC, RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES § 1.1, available at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/, archived at http://perma.cc/R3TE-J768 (last
updated Nov. 13, 2012); see also John Crawford, Predicting Failure, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 171,
197–98 (2012) (explaining the CAMELS system and noting that it “is highly confidential and is
known only to the relevant examiners and bank managers”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2402201

1 - Baradaran_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2014]

10/7/2014 12:15 PM

REGULATION BY HYPOTHETICAL

1265

E. Capital
The capital regime requires banks to have a capital floor, which
is the regulatory version of equity or net worth—it is the amount by
which a firm’s assets exceed the firm’s liabilities. 62 If a bank meets
minimum capital requirements, there will be little need for
governmental micromanagement of bank activities. The minimum
capital requirement is designed to protect safety and soundness by
forcing firms to have more skin in the game and ownership of their
risks. The theory of forcing firms to maintain a floor on capital is that
the higher the floor, the less likely a firm is to engage in risky
activities. Therefore, the battle between regulators and banks has been
over how much capital is required, with banks generally advocating
less and regulators encouraging more.63
The more equity a bank has, all other things being equal, the
less likely it is to fall into insolvency. Capital is often referred to as a
buffer, 64 but to think of it as a buffer is misleading. When a bank
experiences a loss, the bank’s capital is not affected. Only when a bank
experiences a net balance sheet loss (when they have more liabilities
than assets) does capital become relevant. In that event, the net loss
represents a loss of assets against liabilities; when assets fall below
liabilities, the bank is insolvent and equity (capital) losses occur. In
other words, capital is shareholder equity; it does not refer to bank
reserves.
Capital is purely a balance sheet item and represents the gap
between the firm’s equity or ownership interest (i.e., common stock)
and its liabilities. It is not cash in a safe, but it is a reflection of how a
bank funds itself. A bank can either fund itself through debt (i.e.,
loans) or equity (i.e., stock). The more a bank funds itself through the
latter, the higher the capital ratio. 65 Banks prefer higher leverage (to
62. CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 28, at 252–53.
63. Dawn Kopecki & Zachary Tracer, Dimon Says Banks to Have More Capital Than They
Can Use, BLOOMBERG.COM (Feb. 26, 2013, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0226/dimon-says-banks-to-have-more-capital-than-they-know-how-to-use.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/PV8M-YUZN (quoting JPMorgan, Chase & Co. CEO Jamie Dimon as believing that all
banks would soon have too much capital and that regulation encouraging banks to hold on to
capital could impede growth).
64. James Shotter, Switzerland Imposes Capital Buffer on Banks, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 13,
2013, 2:58 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/be839108-75ca-11e2-b702-00144feabdc0.html.
65. Banks prefer to fund themselves through debt because they view it as cheaper than
equity. However, Admati and Hellwig dispute this. They argue that it is only cheaper today
because banks are already highly leveraged and must pay more for equity because of their
heightened risk exposure. Admanti and Hellwig contend that this way of doing business is not
the only option. ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG
WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 112 (2013).
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have less of an equity interest) because they can achieve greater
returns on their investments. However, this leverage also creates
heightened risk. For example, shareholders who stand to lose more
equity (capital) will likely engage in less risk taking than one that is
less exposed. 66 One of the purposes of the capital regime, therefore, is
to affect manager behavior in favor of more prudent decisionmaking.
Over the past thirty years, regulators and banks have been engaged in
an ongoing negotiation over how much capital is ideal.
The capital regime is quite complex, with capital ratios that are
calculated based on several tiers of capital that depend on levels of
risk. 67 Common stock, for example, is Tier 1, and subordinated debt is
Tier 2. 68 Each bank must retain certain percentages of each tier of
capital, with more risk-tolerant banks preferring the higher-risk Tier
2 category and risk-averse banks and regulators preferring the safer
Tier 1 categories. 69 Aside from the voluminous discussions on how
capital should be categorized, it is the consensus of most regulators
and industry observers that the ultimate strength of a bank rests on
its net worth or capital funds.70
The capital regime started in earnest just as the activity
restrictions regime started to fall out of favor. The capital regime
allows banks to conduct their business any way they choose as long as
they have a minimum amount of regulatory capital. This new regime
seemed appropriate for the new world of complex banking, where
banks were constantly one step ahead of the regulators that were
trying to prohibit new risk taking. It is perhaps the easiest form of
bank regulation for the modern era—although its simplicity has
diminished as capital requirements have been spliced into tiers,
percentages, and tranches. 71
Complexities have also grown because capital requirements
have become entangled with risk modeling, as discussed below. Capital
requirements have been a part of U.S. regulatory history since the
66. See David Enrich &Victoria McGrane, Capital Rules Tighten for Big Banks, WALL ST.
J.
(June
27,
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702303627104576409662082986084.
67. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 14 (2006).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Sandra L. Ryon, History of Bank Capital Adequacy Analysis (FDIC Div. of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 69-41, 1969).
71. Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir. Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., The Dog and the Frisbee 9,
Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 366th Economic Policy Symposium, “The
Changing Policy Landscape”, Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Aug. 31, 2012), available at
http://www.bis.org/review/r120905a.pdf?frames=0, archived at http://perma.cc/FM2-USFX.
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earliest days of banking but were applied inconsistently and
haphazardly until they were standardized in the 1980s in response to
large-scale bank failures. 72 During this time, both U.S. and
international banks were distressed. The Basel Committee, an
international forum of bank regulators that issue standardized
supervisory guidelines, was formed to streamline and modernize
international banking regulation. 73 In 1988, the Basel Committee
issued a final report (“Basel I”) that included minimum capital
requirements. 74 The Committee’s innovative approach to capital
accounted for differences in the riskiness of assets. Basel I created four
risk categories and announced guidelines weighing each balance sheet
item’s riskiness and assigning it to a category. 75 The capital required
for each bank was determined by weighing and sorting assets by risk. 76

72. 1895 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ANN. REP. 39 (reporting that in 1895 state
minimum capital requirements “varie[d] from no provisions at all, and elsewhere from $5,000 to
$100,000”). The first federal capital requirements were part of the NBA in 1864, which required
banks to retain various capital thresholds depending on the population of the surrounding areas.
National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 7, 13 Stat. 99, 101 (1864) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.). In 1933, the federal government introduced capital requirements that were a
percentage of a firm’s deposits. Roland I. Robinson, The Capital Deposit Ratio in Banking
Supervision, 49 J. POL. ECON. 41, 41, 43, 47–49 (1941). At that time, minimum capital levels were
determined by calculating a leverage ratio that compared a bank’s capital to total assets. The
ratio was set by the OCC and the FRB at six percent for some community banks and five percent
for larger regional banks; the FDIC established a six percent ratio for all banks, regardless of
size. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, Interpretive Letter 3-1506 (Dec.
17, 1981); FDIC, Statement of Policy on Capital Adequacy, 46 Fed. Reg. 62,693-02 (1981); see also
Phil Battey, Regulators Fail on Uniform Bank Capital Policy, AM BANKER, Dec. 18, 1981, at 1
(summarizing the different approaches adopted by the FDIC, OCC, and Federal Reserve).
However, even these capital requirements were difficult to enforce without a legislative mandate
supporting regulatory enforcement. Banking statutes at the time did not mention specific capital
requirements. In one case, in spite of the fact that a bank “ranked near the bottom of its peer
group in all of the equity related ratios,” the Fifth Circuit held that the OCC had not presented
sufficient evidence to show that operating with less capital was unsafe or unsound. First Nat’l
Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 677, 679, 685 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983).
The regulatory enforcement mandate came when Congress passed the International Lending
Supervision Act of 1983, which required banking regulators to “cause banking institutions to
achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing minimum levels of capital for such
banking institutions.” International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181,
908(a)(1), 97 Stat. 1278, 1280, § 908(a)(2), 97 Stat. 1280 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(2)). The
Act gave regulators the authority to establish minimum levels of capital and deemed it an unsafe
and unsound practice for banks to have capital below the threshold. Id. at § 908(a)(2), 97 Stat.
1280, §908(b)(1), 97 Stat. 1280 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(2), (b)(1)).
73. See Benton E. Gup, Introduction to the Basel Capital Accords, in THE NEW BASEL
CAPITAL ACCORD 1, 1 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2004).
74. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs04a.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CG3H-WXUZ.
75. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 67, at 231.
76. Id.
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The Basel I approach was adopted by U.S. regulators in 1989 and
became effective in 1990. 77
The Basel I framework favored a “risk-weighted” ratio, as
opposed to the previous U.S. regime of a simple “leverage ratio.” 78 The
innovative risk weighing was said to more accurately account for
different types of risks, but even this new complex and sensitive
framework soon became too simplistic for an increasingly complex
banking system. In short, these risk categories were both under- and
overinclusive, promoting regulatory arbitrage. Several shortcomings
became apparent: (1) the four risk categories were overly broad
approximations of risk, which caused some banks to easily evade the
rules by investing in risky assets or off–balance sheet items that were
far riskier than their category acknowledged; 79 (2) the Basel I
categories accounted only for credit risk and not other types of risk,
such as operational risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, and so
forth; 80 and (3) the Basel I framework did not adequately gauge risks
for large banks that were pioneering new products, such as derivatives
that could not easily be categorized without complex internal risk
models. 81 In other words, risk weighing suffered from the same

77. OCC Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 4169 (Jan. 27, 1989) (codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A); Capital Adequacy Guidelines for State Member Banks: Risk-Based Measure,
12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. A (2014); Capital Adequacy Guidelines for Bank Holding Companies: RiskBased Measure, 12 C.F. R. pt. 225, app. A; Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital, 12 C.F.R.
pt. 325, app. A. Congress implemented similar requirements for thrift institutions as part of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 301,
103 Stat. 183, 303–04 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463–1464 (1990)). The thrift regulator has
previously proposed similar guidelines. See Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Proposed Rule,
Regulatory Capital Requirements for Insured Institutions, 53 Fed. Reg. 51,800 (Dec. 23, 1988).
78. See BASEL COMM., supra note 67, at 12 (“In developing the revised Framework, the
Committee has sought to arrive at significantly more risk-sensitive capital requirements . . . .”);
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REVISED BASEL III LEVERAGE RATIO FRAMEWORK AND
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 1 (2014) (“[A] simple leverage ratio framework is critical and
complementary to the risk-based capital framework.”).
79. See DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION 80–82 (2008) (cataloguing various types of regulatory arbitrage possible
under Basel I, but concluding that “there is very little empirical work that quantifies the
practice”); Steven R. Grenadier & Brian Hall, Risk-Based Capital Standards and the Riskiness
of Bank Portfolios: Credit and Factor Risks, 26 REG. SCI. & URBAN ECON. 433, 438 (1996); Patricia
A. McCoy, Musings on the Seeming Inevitability of Global Convergence in Banking Law, 7 CONN.
INS. L.J. 433, 450–56 (2001); Camille M. Caesar, Note, Capital-Based Regulation and U.S.
Banking Reform, 101 YALE L.J 1525, 1542 n.106 (1992).
80. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RISK-BASED CAPITAL: BANK REGULATORS
NEED TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY AND OVERCOME IMPEDIMENTS TO FINALIZING THE PROPOSED
BASEL II FRAMEWORK 9–10, 16 (2007) (identifying various risks and explaining that Basel I did
not account for them); Michael P. Malloy, Capital Adequacy and Regulatory Objectives, 25
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 299, 313–14 (2002).
81. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 80, at 17.
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problems that plague risk management in general: the inability to
account for new bank activities that generate unprecedented risks.
Basel II was issued in 2004 to address these problems. 82 It
accounted for a variety of risks in addition to credit risk and permitted
firms to use their internal risk modeling mechanisms to evaluate more
complex product lines. 83 Basel II also called for heightened supervision
and disclosure in an effort to facilitate market discipline of capital
retention by banks. 84 A key criticism of Basel II focuses on its reliance
on internal risk modeling by banks, which is often unreliable and hard
to evaluate. 85 Others note that the outsourcing of risk modeling to selfinterested financial institutions is inappropriate and can lead to
abuse. 86 Basel II was adopted by U.S. regulators for only the largest
banks and only in a way that required them to implement its
requirements on a phased-in basis. 87

82. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (2004), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf?noframes=1,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/RZ4-5TJL
[hereinafter BASEL II]; see BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, OVERVIEW OF THE NEW
BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD 2 (2001), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca02.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/K8UR-W9TX (stating that the Basel Committee’s primary goal was “to deliver a
more risk-sensitive standardized approach that on average neither raises nor lowers regulator
capital for internationally active banks”).
83. BASEL II, supra note 82, at 48–112, 142–48.
84. Id. at 158–90.
85. See, e.g., TARULLO, supra note 79, at 79, 152–59; George G. Kaufman, Basel II: The Roar
that Moused, in THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD 39, 43 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2004):
[T]he loss rates determined by regulators are subject to large errors so that gaming is
still likely, and the models used by the banks to generate their internal values are
likely to be too complex and opaque for supervisors (and even many bankers
themselves) to understand thoroughly, so the resulting capital amounts will be
difficult to evaluate for adequacy and compliance with the requirements.
Douglas O. Edwards, Comment, An Unfortunate “Tail”: Reconsidering Risk Management
Incentives After the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 247, 268 (2010)
(concluding that the value-at-risk model “is powerful, but . . . but fails to capture an outlier event
that might topple a financial institution”).
86. Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial
Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 180–86 (2009)
[hereinafter Code, Crash]; Erik F. Gerding, The Dangers of Delegating Financial Regulation to
Risk Models, 29 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1, 5–6 (2010) [hereinafter Dangers of
Delegating]; Joseph J. Norton, A Perceived Trend in Modern International Financial Regulation:
Increasing Reliance on a Public-Private Partnership, 37 INT’L LAW 43, 57 (2003).
87. John C. Dugan & Jennifer Xi, Briefing Paper to European Parliament Policy
Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy, U.S. Implementation of Basel II: Final Rules
Issued, but No Supervisory Approvals to Date (2011), available at, http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201110/20111012ATT29102/20111012ATT29
102EN.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E2T8-8EVD.
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The financial crisis of 2008 brought with it a renewed emphasis
on capital requirements. 88 Some claimed that insufficient enforcement
of capital requirements caused the crisis. 89 Even so, the Treasury took
the position—and Congress ultimately agreed—that the capital
requirement percentages should be left up to regulators so as to
prevent too rigid of a framework. 90 Three years after the passage of
Dodd-Frank, regulators are still debating the best formula to use as
they implement new capital rules.91
Meanwhile, the shortcomings of Basel II have produced the
recently promulgated Basel III accord. 92 Erik Gerding explains that
the gamesmanship of Basel I and Basel II begat Basel III. 93 However,
Basel III still relies on risk weighing to categorize different capital
categories. Basel III has honed (or some say further complicated) 94 the
risk-weighted formula that applies to the largest banks. The new ratio,
a very low three percent, includes securitized risks, on–balance sheet

88. See, e.g., William M. Isaac, How to Save the Financial System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19,
2008, at A23 (arguing that the U.S. implementation of Basel II will exacerbate the financial crisis
by requiring additional capital when none is available); Lawrence B. Lindsey, The Panic of 2008:
Loosen Deposit Insurance Rules to Prevent Bank Run, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A27 (arguing
that risk-based capital standards are not appropriate).
89. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATION:
FINANCIAL CRISIS HIGHLIGHTS NEED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF LEVERAGE AT FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND ACROSS SYSTEM 6 (2009); Damian Paletta, Regulators Agree to Create Stricter
Capital Requirements for Banks, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2009, 2:55 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123868295604882511.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Q37UREPV (quoting U.S. Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan as stating that “there was not
enough capital in the banking system coming into” the financial crisis). But see TARULLO, supra
note 79, at 259 (concluding that it is unlikely that “any capital regulation regime could have
sufficiently contained [mortgage-backed securities] risks so that the subprime situation would
have been merely a problem rather than a crisis”).
90. Mike Konczal, Dodd-Frank is Finally Being Implemented. Will that be Enough?, WASH.
POST (May 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/06/dodd-frankis-finally-being-implemented-will-that-be-enough/, archived at http://perma.cc/8CFA-LBEQ.
91. See Jennifer McGillivary & Hung-Gay Fung, The Need for Ethical Reform in the US
Financial Industry, 5 INT’L REV. ACCT., BANKING & FIN. 17, 36 (2013) (“If there were a clear
answer to all of the questions [surrouding regulation and ethics in the financial industry], much
of the concern about the financial industry and its professionals would not exist.”); Charles M.
Horn et al., Dodd-Frank Implementation: Navigating the Road Ahead, MONDAQ (Jan. 3, 2013),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/214152/Financial+Services/DoddFrank+Implementation
+Navigating+The+Road+Ahead, archived at http://perma.cc/AL7Z-A39M (“We anticipate that, in
the first half of 2013, the federal bank regulatory agencies will finalize the three capital proposals
that were released in June 2012.”).
92. Emily Lee, Basel III and Its New Capital Requirements, as Distinguished From Basel
II, 131 BANKING L.J. 27, 27–28 (2014).
93. ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 197–235 (2014).
94. Haldane, supra note 71, at 6–7 (noting that Basel III is six-hundred pages long
compared to just thirty pages of Basel I without any added benefit).
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assets, derivative exposures, 95 and other modern financial products.
Critics claim that, even with Basel III’s targeted approach, the ratio is
too low and the formula still allows for circumvention and risk
hiding. 96 Basel III has not yet been adopted by the United States. 97
Regulators remain uncertain about which parts of Basel III’s new
formula to adopt and how much they want to rely on blunter leverage
ratios. 98 Many observers, including Senators Sherrod Brown and
David Vitter, have proposed abandoning the Basel framework and
simply refocusing on heightened leverage ratios. 99
In The Bankers’ New Clothes, Professors Anat Admati and
Martin Hellwig argue that the legislative and regulatory reactions to
the financial crisis leave the essential structure of the economy’s
circulatory system as fragile as it ever was. 100 Their book reads as an
ode to simple and strict capital requirements. Admati and Hellwig
identify a threshold cause of and a threshold response to the crisis
banking: the cause, too much debt; the solution, significantly more
equity. 101 After that buffer is established, the urgency of getting
exactly right every detail of every stress test, living will, or individual
regulation will matter less. Admati and Hellwig argue, in other words,
95. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, BASEL III LEVERAGE RATIO: U.S. PROPOSES AMERICAN
ADD-ON; BASEL COMMITTEE PROPOSES IMPORTANT DENOMINATOR CHANGES 7 (2013),
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/07.19.13.Basel_.3.Leverage.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/UQ8J-SKS8.
96. See Brooke Masters, Basel III Capital Rules Too Low, Says Turner, FIN. TIMES (Mar.
16,
2011,
7:10
PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/92b24f80-4fff-11e0-9ad100144feab49a.html#axzz2cYQSNI90, archived at http://perma.cc/LNA5-52GQ; Thomas Hoenig,
Basel III Capital Interim Final Rule and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FDIC (July 9, 2013),
https://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/board/hoenig/statement7-9-2013.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/6YF-7CVV (noting that the Basel III standard “remains inadequate to the task of
assuring the American public . . . that our capital standards are adequate to contribute to
financial stability.”).
97. Basel III was adopted by the Federal Reserve board on July 2, 2013. Tom Braithwaite,
Banks Await Orders as Fed Acts on Basel III, FIN. TIMES (July 2, 2013, 7:18 PM), http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/94abb696-e337-11e2-9bb2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2cYQSNI90, archived at
http://perma.cc/Q4W4-X4AT.
98. Simon Watkins, Basel Loosens Banks’ Leverage Ratio Proposals but New FX Trading
World Is Still Uncertain, EUROMONEY.COM (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.euromoney.com/Article/
3297585/Basel-loosens-banks-leverage-ratio-proposals-but-new-FX-trading-world-is-stilluncertain.html, archived at http://perma.cc/QR2Z-63E7.
99. James Pethokoukis, Senators Brown and Vitter Offer a Smart and Simple Plan to End
Too Big To Fail, AEIDEAS (Apr. 25, 2013, 10:06 AM), http://www.aei-ideas.org/2013/04/senatorsbrown-and-vitter-offers-a-smart-and-simple-plan-to-end-too-big-to-fail/, archived at http://
perma.cc/Q7WS-J6HT ; see also Felix Salmon, Basel: The SIFI Surcharge Arrives, REUTERS (June
27, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/06/27/basel-the-sifi-surcharge-arrives/,
archived at http://perma.cc/HXG8-4NGL (discussing Basel III’s potentially negative incentive
structure).
100. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 65, at 192.
101. Id.
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that we can and should have debates about risk management and
activity restrictions, but only after the basic parameters of
significantly increased equity are put in place. 102 This new model is
best defined as regulation by capital—or their preferred term, equity.
The premise is that private actors are incentivized to displace the costs
of their risky activities to the fullest extent possible and that banking
regulation should prevent that displacement to the greatest extent
possible. 103 In other words, regulators should push banks toward
equity-based, rather than debt-based, financing, notwithstanding
pressures on managers to minimize existing equity positions. Activity
restrictions, risk management infrastructure, and the rest are all
terrific tools for in-house use. But allowing those mechanisms to
replace the risk-dampening effect of increased equity is foolish and
dangerous.
In conclusion, the future of capital requirements is unclear.
Many advocate that regulators should get entirely out of the business
of activity restrictions, risk management, and general oversight, that
the only thing regulators should enforce is capital requirements and
leave the rest to the banks. 104 On the other hand, the banking industry
continues to oppose heightened capital requirements. It will continue
to fall on regulators to determine how much capital is required to reach
the desired outcome of changing managerial incentives to favor
prudence over risk taking. 105

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Victoria Finkle, Regulators Should Boost the Leverage Ratio for Big Banks, Senators
Say, AM. BANKER (Nov. 22, 2013, 12:58 PM), available at http://www.americanbanker.com/
issues/178_226/regulators-should-boost-the-leverage-ratio-for-big-banks-senators-say-10638581.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9HMF-G7LF; Ray Grace, Don’t Blame Camels for Human
BANKER
(June
4,
2013,
4:30
PM),
available
at
http://
Failure,
AM.
www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/dont-blame-camels-for-human-failures-1059610-1.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/V8EQ-GUJV; Mark W. Olson, Banking Industry Overly Focused on
BANKER
(July
18,
2013,
1:45
PM),
available
at
http://
Capital,
AM.
www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/banking-industry-overly-focused-on-capital-10607001.html, archived at http://perma.cc/F5D2-MQFQ; Richard J. Parsons, It’s Time to Kill CAMELS,
AM. BANKER (June 1, 2013), available at http://www.americanbanker.com/ magazine/123_6/itstime-to-kill-camels-according-to-bofa-risk-exec-1059172-1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
5GT4-UR5F.
105. Julie A. Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 IND.
L.J. 645, 696–97 (2012) (noting that regulators had broad discretion but were not at all diligent
in enforcing them in the past ten years).
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F. Risk Management
The risk management regime involved the most hands-off
regulatory oversight mechanism prior to Dodd-Frank. To respond to
increased complexity in financial markets as well as increased
diversity of financial products, banks saw risk modeling as the most
effective way to protect themselves from losses. Resulting risk models
took many different forms but generally involved complex computer
models that accounted for potential dangers to the firm, product line,
or specific trade. 106 As banks relied more and more on these risk
models to hedge their positions, regulators took note. But the
regulators did not do so through comprehensive or thorough oversight
of risk models. Instead, they stayed on the sidelines as banks
developed and relied on these new management tools. 107
The risk management regime was born in the mid-1980s as
firms grappled with unanticipated market shocks. After the stock
market crash of 1987, many firms adopted technology-based risk
management practices. 108 During this time, Value at Risk (“VaR”)
measurements were initiated when JP Morgan’s CEO Dennis
Weatherstone wanted an answer to the question, “How much could
JPM lose if tomorrow turns out to be a relatively bad day?”109 The
purpose of the VaR regime is to determine how much exposure a firm
has to downside risk based on highly sophisticated modeling. 110 VaR
modeling was labeled “the New Benchmark for Managing Financial
Risk,” and there have been “over 200 books published on VaR since the
October 1987 crash, roughly one a month.” 111
If VaR signaled a fundamental shift in risk modeling, firm-led
stress testing (i.e., firms using computer models to determine the type
and extent of loss they could withstand) was the second wave of reform
in risk management, with “over 250 articles on stress testing in the
past ten years, or more than one a fortnight.”112 The risk management
106. See Dangers of Delegating, supra note 86, at 1 (discussing the combination of
technological advances and financial innovation that allowed for the development of these
sophisticated computer models beginning in the 1980s).
107. See Code, Crash, supra note 86, at 133.
108. Richard Griffiths & Shahid Chaudhri, How to Avoid Another Failure of Risk
Management (Mar. 9, 2009), available at http://www.investment-strategy-wire.com/
archive_1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8H4-6ZF9.
109. Haldane, supra note 5, at 3.
110. Peter Conti-Brown, A Proposed Fat-Tail Metric: Disclosure, Derivatives, and the
Measurement of Financial Risk, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2010).
111. Haldane, supra note 5, at 4.
112. See id. (“Stress testing has gained greater prominence and credibility within banks as a
complementary risk management and capital planning tool to provide a different risk
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regime coincided with a golden decade in banking. “Between October
1998 and June 2007, banks’ share prices increased almost 60%[,] and
their balance sheets rose more than threefold.” 113 Andrew Haldane
compared the risk management system to Hans Christian Andersen’s
fairy tale “The Emperor’s New Clothes.” 114 Haldane analogized the risk
models to the Emperor’s nonexistent clothing: banks flaunted their
triumph over risk when they were, in fact, walking around naked for a
decade. 115 “The subprime market has played the role of the child in the
fairytale,” Haldane wrote, “naively but honestly shifting everyone’s
perceptions about how threadbare the financial system has become.” 116
This following Section first discusses the creation of risk management
and provides an overview of the types of regulation under the regime.
Then, it reviews the various problems of risk management, including
the difficulty of modeling future events based on past occurrences, the
failure to account for systemic problems, and the misalignment of
incentives.
1. Regulators and Risk
The rise of risk management as a vehicle for risk containment
paralleled the rise of what has been labeled the “New Governance”
regime in regulation. The term “New Governance” denotes an
emerging system of regulatory governance in which the government
and the private sector work together in dialogue to craft regulation—
as opposed to the traditional system of top-down, government-dictated
command-and-control regulation. 117 Bank regulation during the rise of
the risk management regime looked very much like a public-private
partnership. In theory, regulators were to work with large firms to
oversee firms’ internal risk management processes. In reality,
regulators deferred to banks to model risk. Rather than critically
engaging with risk models, regulators’ oversight was mainly aimed at
assuring that banks had models in place.
perspective.”); see also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND STRESS
TESTING PRACTICES AND SUPERVISION 6 (May 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs147.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9FUU-7YRZ.
113. Haldane, supra note 5, at 4.
114. Id. at 2.
115. Id. at 5.
116. Id.
117. Orly Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, (San Diego Legal Studies Paper
No. 12-101, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2179160/,
archived at http://perma.cc/7L6G-NKFZ . For a synopsis of New Governance as applied to finance,
see Saule Omorova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry, 35
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665, 666 (2010).
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A U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) report
released in 2009 states as a principle premise that “financial
regulators have an important role in assessing risk management
systems at financial institutions.” 118 To assess whether a firm’s
internal management is accurately controlling risks, bank examiners
gather data from the firms and then assign a rating meant to assess
the quality of the institution’s risk management system. 119 Before the
enactment of Dodd-Frank, this oversight was entity-specific with no
coordinated measure to gauge system-wide risks. Nevertheless, each
regulator engaged in highly technical modeling of institutional risks,
most of which incorporated and evaluated the firm’s own risk-modeling
formulas. Among the various risk-control measures used by regulators,
the following were the most prominent:
The FDIC’s CAMELS rating system uses a firm’s financial
statements as well as on-site examinations to determine the
firm’s condition with respect to capital adequacy, assetsmanagement capability, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to
market risk. 120
The Federal Reserve has an “R” rating framework (which it has
not released to the public) whose primary purpose is “assessing
inherent risk and risk management practices of large financial
institutions.” 121 The Federal Reserve has a program for large,
complex banking organizations that provides “continuous
supervision” with a dedicated team assigned to each
institution. 122 The examiner considers “(1) board of directors and
senior management oversight; (2) policies, procedures, and
limits; (3) risk monitoring and management information system;
and (4) internal controls for each of the risk areas.” 123
The OCC has on-site examiners who assess a firm’s risk
management practices, and the examiners’ findings are sent to
the bank’s board of directors. OCC examiners assess the

118. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 09-499T, FINANCIAL REGULATION: REVIEW OF
REGULATORS’ OVERSIGHT OF RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AT A LIMITED NUMBER OF LARGE,
COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 22–24 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/
130/121973.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6QPM-YK46.
119. Id. at 3.
120. Id. at 10. Sensitivity to Market Risk is a new measure and foreshadows the move to a
regulation by hypothetical. This indicator is meant to gauge how vulnerable a particular portfolio
is to counterparty risk or systemic contagion.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 11.
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“quality, quantity, and overall direction of risks” in nine
categories: strategic, reputation, credit, interest rate, liquidity,
price, foreign currency translation, transaction, and compliance.
Specifically, OCC examiners determine the quality of risk
management by “assess[ing] policies, processes, personnel, and
control systems in each category.” 124
The SEC and FINRA (an independent securities regulator)
“assess the risk management systems of large broker-dealers
using discrete, but risk-focused examinations.” 125 These
regulators primarily focus on “compliance with their rules and
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.” 126 The SEC and
FINRA conduct “regularly scheduled target examinations that
focus on the risk areas identified in their risk assessment and on
compliance with relevant capital rules and customer protection
rules. At the largest institutions, SEC conducts examinations
every three years, while FINRA conducts annual examinations
of all broker-dealers.” 127
The GAO report noted that these various systems failed during
the last financial crisis as many risks were unidentified or ignored by
regulators. 128 Regulators admit that “they had not fully appreciated
the extent of weaknesses [in risk management] until the financial
crisis occurred and risk management systems were tested by
events.”129 Regulators also acknowledged that “they had relied heavily
on management representations of risks.” 130 Among the various
weaknesses in bank-run stress testing at institutions prior to the
crisis, the GAO highlighted the institutional practice of relying on
“intuition” to determine firms’ vulnerability to certain types of risk and
found that senior managers often “questioned the need for additional
stress testing, particularly for worst-case scenarios that they thought
were implausible.” 131
124. Id.
125. Id. at 13.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 3–4. For example, even though many recommendations by examiners were never
addressed by institutions, little regulatory follow-up occurred. The regulators interviewed for the
GAO study admit that “despite these identified weaknesses, they did not take forceful action—
such as changing their assessments—until the crisis occurred because the institutions reported
a strong financial position and senior management had presented the regulators with plans for
change.” Id. at 16.
129. Id. at 17.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
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Dodd-Frank streamlined risk management with industry-wide
stress testing, discussed at length below, and the creation of the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”). 132 FSOC is now the
primary regulator “charged with identifying risks to the financial
stability of the United States; promoting market discipline; and
responding to emerging risks to the stability of the United States’
financial system.” 133 The OCC is currently in the process of formalizing
new risk management standards that represent “heightened
expectations” for the banking industry. 134 Acknowledging insufficient
enforcement of risk management standards before Dodd-Frank, the
OCC plans to increase both its oversight and enforcement of their new
standards. 135 It is currently working with the banking industry to
finalize these rules. Industry experts view the new regulatory
emphasis on standardization of risk management as a sign that “risk
governance is here to stay and its importance will only increase over
time.” 136
2. Problems with the Risk Management Regime
It is important to note the failures of the risk management
regime here because they implicate regulation by hypothetical, which
is an outgrowth of key risk management principles. For example,
individual firms have been using stress testing for nearly two decades
as a part of their risk management strategy. 137 However, the risk
management system failed because it did not meet its main objective:
protecting firms from losses due to unanticipated risks. In other words,
the models failed to anticipate the risks that brought down the system.
132. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL CREATED
UNDER THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS (Oct. 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FAQ%20%20FinancialStabilityOversightCouncilOctober2010FINALv2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
32WL-JD8C.
OF
THE
TREASURY,
133. Financial
Stability
Oversight
Council,
DEP’T
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/home.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/M558NXAK (last updated Apr. 25, 2013).
134. OCC Guidelines Establishing Heightened Guidelines for Certain Large Insured
National Banks, Insured Federal Savings Associations, and Insured Federal Branches;
Integration of CFR Parts 30 and 170, 79 FR 4282-01 (proposed Jan. 27, 2014), available at
http://occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2014/nr-occ-2014-4a.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/HV7U-X3S2.
135. Id.
136. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, RISK GOVERENANCE: VISUAL MEMORANDUM ON
GUIDELINES PROPOSED BY THE OCC (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.dpw.com/sites/default/files/
Risk.Governance.Visual.Memorandum.on_.Guidelines.Proposed.by_.the_.OCC_.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/5GYX-8DZA.
137. MARIO QUAGLIARIELLO, STRESS-TESTING THE BANKING SYSTEM 18 (2009).
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“They failed Keynes’ test—that it is better to be roughly right than
precisely wrong. With hindsight, these models were both very precise
and very wrong.”138 After the crisis, it seems that all risk modeling,
including internal stress testing, was an unequivocal failure. 139 And
modeling and stress testing not only failed by not preventing the
financial crisis, they failed because, like Orpheus’s harp, they lulled
regulators and firms alike into contented tranquility that all was well.
Many insightful commentators have identified problems with
the risk management system in general and firm-run stress testing
specifically. 140 The financial system readily admits that its risk
modeling missed the mark: “A survey of 500 risk managers by KPMG
in October [2008] found that 92% intended to review their risk
management practices.” 141 Generally, risk management might be
criticized as a futile exercise that attempts to control the
uncontrollable. Although this is not to say that it is useless. Indeed,
risk management can give the firm a lot of useful information about
its potential vulnerabilities. But it cannot be overrelied on as the
antidote to risk. Specifically, three shortcomings of the risk
management system—“black-swan bias,” the system’s failure to
account for systemic risk, and the problematic incentives the system
creates—are outlined below.
a. Modeling for the Future Based on the Past
In their attempt to predict the future, risk management models
can be shortsighted. Namely, they suffer from two related phenomena:
“black-swan bias” and “disaster myopia.” In 2007, Nassim Taleb’s book
Fooled by Randomness explained the “black swan theory,” which refers
to events that are outliers, have an extreme impact, and can only be

138. Haldane, supra note 5, at 2.
139. J.V. Rizzi, Stress Tests Failed the Public, AM. BANKER (Mar. 20, 2013, 11:50 AM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/stress-tests-failed-the-public-1057668-1.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/Y792-LC7L; Til Schuermann, The Fed’s Stress Tests Add Risk to the
Financial System, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 19, 2013, 7:08 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887324532004578362543899602754.html, archived at http://perma.cc/BX45299C.
140. SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, RISK MANAGEMENT LESSONS FROM THE GLOBAL BANKING
CRISIS OF 2008 26 (2009).
141. Haldane, supra note 5, at 5; see also Inadequate Risk Management Models Continue to
Expose the Global Financial System to Great Risks, MARKETWIRED.COM (Apr. 19, 2010, 12:01
AM) (finding that “[c]urrent quantitative risk management models simply do not work in
practice . . . .”), http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/inadequate-risk-managementmodels-continue-expose-global-financial-system-great-1169041.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/
LC8T-3Z2D.
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predicted or explained after they have occurred. 142 Black-swan events
cannot be predicted but are incredibly consequential. History is
littered with such unanticipated events, but people do not prepare for
them because black-swan events represent large deviations from the
norm. Taleb’s theory proved quite prescient; in 2007, he wrote at
length about the financial system’s failure to predict and prepare for
risk: “Go ask your portfolio manager for his definition of ‘risk,’ ” and
odds are that he will supply you with a measure that excludes the
possibility of the Black Swan—hence one that has no better predictive
value for assessing the total risks than astrology.” 143
The underlying problem, then, for risk management models is
that any model that uses past events to predict the probability of future
events suffers from a black-swan bias. For example, many risk models
prior to 2005 did not account for the possibility of a precipitous decline
in national housing prices. 144 The models instead accounted for
inflation risk (which the market experienced in the 1970s and 1980s)
and other recessionary events, such as stock market declines. 145 In
analyzing why stress testing failed, the Basel Committee blamed the
use of “historical statistical relationships to assess risk.” 146 “They
assume that risk is driven by a known and constant statistical
process—i.e., they assume that historical relationships constitute a
good basis for forecasting the development of future risks. The crisis
has revealed serious flaws with relying solely on such an approach.” 147
This is not to say that historical risks should not be modeled
and prepared for, lest history repeat itself in catastrophic ways.
Markets are cyclical, and events such as high unemployment, inflation,
and low GDP occur with each recession. It is imperative that firms and
regulators model and prepare for these events as they are likely to
recur periodically. However, those events are lagging indicators of a
problem. The real challenge is recognizing bubbles that cause

142. NASSIM N. TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CHANCE IN LIFE AND
(2005).
143. Nassim N. Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr.
22,
2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/22/books/chapters/0422-1sttale.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/XCH7-G3AY.
144. Why Economists Failed to Predict the FINANCIAL Crisis, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May
13, 2009), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/why-economists-failed-to-predict-thefinancial-crisis/, archived at http://perma.cc/4LMH-74TE.
145. See Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial
Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 53 (2009) (noting Citigroup’s failure to account for a “national
housing downturn”); Dangers of Delegating, supra note 86, at 4 (discussing models using
“historical data to calculate probabilities of future risk”).
146. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 67, at 3.
147. Id.
IN THE MARKETS 26
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irrationality and overvaluation, and identifying risks taken on the
assumption that a certain event could not occur. Not all crises are
created by bubbles, 148 but firms are often more vulnerable to
overextension during a boom. And as others have thoroughly
documented, bubbles are vexingly difficult to identify when one is in
the midst of a bubble. 149
Not only is it difficult to predict and prepare for black swans,
but it is also difficult to imagine a severe crisis when one has not
occurred in the recent past. Andrew Haldane labels this phenomenon
“Disaster Myopia”—that is, “the agents’ propensity to underestimate
the probability of adverse outcomes, in particular small probability
events from the distant past.”150 While all bubbles and busts display
similar patterns, each crisis has a unique and unprecedented trigger.
In other words, while we repeatedly make faulty assumptions (like
underestimating unprecedented risks), we never make the same faulty
assumption twice—once we have experienced a national decline in
housing prices, we can imagine it happening again.
Shortsightedness in risk management can be described as a
problem of either scale or scope. Did previous forms of risk
management fail because they did not test against sufficiently adverse
degrees of stress (scale) or because they failed to account for lowprobability events (scope)? The answer has large implications for the
viability of regulation by hypothetical because a problem of scale can
more easily be addressed (and the FRB attempted to test firms against
“severely adverse” scenarios in the latest round of stress testing 151)
than a problem of scope (because it will always be difficult to account
for the unimaginable). 152

148. See Claudio Borio, Change and Consistency in the Financial System: Implications for
Financial Distress and Policy, in THE STRUCTURE AND RESILIENCE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
(Christopher Kent & Jeremy Lawson eds., 2007), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/
publications/confs/2007/pdf/borio.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/638S-AQ27 (“[T]he most classic
source of financial distress [is the] overextension in risk taking and balance sheets in good times,
masked by the veneer of a vibrant economy.”).
149. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2005); GERDING, supra note 93 (discussing the hypothesis
that the economic climate surrounding bubbles causes a weakening of the financial regulation
that would potentially avert a crisis).
149. Haldane, supra note 5, at 6.
150. Id.
151. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TEST 2013 4
(2013).
152. The Basel Committee takes an optimistic view toward the fixability of stress testing
emphasizing that firms should use more severe crisis simulations. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, supra note 67, at 4–5. Basel also suggests that the stress testing lacked some scope

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2402201

1 - Baradaran_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2014]

10/7/2014 12:15 PM

REGULATION BY HYPOTHETICAL

1281

b. Accounting for System-Wide Problems
The financial system’s complexity and interconnectedness is
unprecedented, making it extremely difficult for an individual firm to
predict and manage systemic risk using models. Firms are exposed not
only to the risk that their counterparties might face but also to the
risks confronted by their counterparties’ counterparties. Individual
firms, therefore, are susceptible to many risks that they cannot control
or account for in their models. This problem could be addressed by
more regulatory involvement in risk management. Regulators are able
to collect information from more market players in order to measure
systemic vulnerabilities. Dodd-Frank formed FSOC to identify risks
across the financial sector, 153 but it is too soon to determine the
Counsel’s success. In addition, as discussed below, stress testing with
an eye toward measuring systemic risk could counter individual firm
myopia.
c. Incentives
Proper risk modeling must incentivize firms to envision and
prepare for the worst-case scenario. However, individual firms are
unlikely to forgo high profits in favor of caution, especially when their
counterparties are engaged in highly leveraged markets. During the
recent financial crisis, for example, many troubled firms entered the
subprime market because their counterparties were making large
profit margins on these high-risk products, such as Mortgage-Backed
Securities, Credit Default Swaps, and Collateralized Debt Obligations.
Citibank CEO, Charles O. Prince, put the point this way: “[A]s long as
the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.”154
Bailouts for TBTF firms also pose problematic incentives.
Indeed, the more a bank stands to lose, the more likely it is to be bailed
out—“if a bank owes a small amount it is their problem, a large amount
it is the authorities [sic].” 155 Therefore, large banks like Citibank will
not be rewarded for avoiding risky markets that their counterparties
are engaged in for a few reasons: (1) they will be sacrificing the high
profits going to their competitors; (2) due to the interconnected market,

and should have considered other types of risk—such as contractual or reputation risks in order
to be more effective.
153. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 132.
154. Citi Chief on Buyouts: ‘We’re Still Dancing,’ DEALBOOK (July 10, 2007, 10:54 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/citi-chief-on-buyout-loans-were-still-dancing/, archived
at http://perma.cc/T5WG-DMZZ.
155. Haldane, supra note 5, at 12.
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they will suffer from the failures of their counterparties in any event;
and (3) because of their size, they will likely be bailed out in the event
of their own failure. In short, moral hazard is a significant problem. 156
There is also an important incentive problem within a bank
itself. Many risk managers are not incentivized to run truly revelatory
stress tests because if their firms’ weaknesses are exposed, the risk
managers lose bonuses and regulators would intervene—again leading
to lower bonuses. 157 Therefore, stress testing “was not being
meaningfully used to manage risk. Rather, it was being used to
manage regulation. . . . [It] was not so much regulatory arbitrage as
regulatory camouflage.”158
III. DODD-FRANK’S NEW STRAIN OF REGULATION—REGULATING
BY HYPOTHETICAL
The regulation by hypothetical regime is an extension of the
risk management regime, with the added twist of governmental
approval. I have described regulation by hypothetical as a new strain
of regulation not because the methodology of testing balance sheets to
future hypotheticals is novel, but because hypothetical analysis is now
mandated and managed by government officials and results in
regulatory responses, such as mandated capital enhancements, firm
restructuring, or other remedial measures. Prior to Dodd-Frank, risk
management was an internal firm affair with limited regulatory
oversight—regulators oversaw the firm’s risk management practices
but did not independently gauge risk in any serious way. Dodd-Frank
introduces, for the first time, a regulator-run process of measuring risk
at both entity and systemic levels using the regulators’ own models
and tests. This new regime, which uses hypothetical future scenarios
to test firm strength, is manifest in two of the most important
mandates of Dodd-Frank: stress testing and living wills.
The Sections below consider both of these new agency oversight
tools in depth and situate them in the latest regulatory regime:
regulation by hypothetical. This new regime, like all other regulatory
156. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 63
(2009) (“[While] ‘moral hazard’ has its origins in the insurance industry . . . [e]ventually the term
came to refer to any situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to
take, while the other person bears the cost if things go badly.”); see Peter L. Bernstein, The Moral
Hazard Economy, 87 HARV. BUS. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 101 (2009); See also William A. Lovett,
Moral Hazard, Bank Supervision and Risk-Based Capital Requirements, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1365,
1367 (1989) (discussing a parallel example of moral hazard in the case of First Republic Bank in
the late 1980s).
157. Haldane, supra note 5, at 12–13.
158. Id. at 13.
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innovations, was created to modernize a supervisory structure that
struggles to keep pace with a rapidly changing banking landscape.
A. Stress Tests
The term “stress test” is borrowed from the engineering and
medical world. The most common diagnostic medical test stress test
involves use of electrocardiogram (EKG) and blood tests to determine
the heart’s ability to withstand external stress, which is induced by
heavy exercise or use of targeted drugs. 159 The test is meant to assess
vulnerability or weakness in the heart by exposing it to adverse
conditions. The theory is that pushing the heart to the edge will enable
a doctor to distinguish a diseased and compromised heart from a
healthy one. The doctor can then use preventative care or ex ante
intervention to avoid heart failure. Financial stress tests are meant to
work the same way: by exposing a financial company to external stress,
regulators are able to assess weaknesses or vulnerabilities in
institutions. One important difference between a cardiac stress test
and a financial stress test, which will be elaborated more fully below,
is that the external stress that is placed on the heart is actual stress;
the heart must actually work harder and pump more blood when an
individual runs on a treadmill. In contrast, financial stress tests
involve merely hypothetical exercises that expose bank balance sheets
to various adverse “what-if” scenarios. Because financial stress tests
do not cause actual financial distress, their diagnostic value is reduced.
Financial firms started using their own stress testing in the
mid-1980s as part of their internal risk management structure. During
this time, some regulators also began to conduct targeted stress tests
on a few firms. 160 The Federal Housing Enterprise Financial Safety
and Soundness Act of 1992 (“FHEFSSA”) required the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight (“OFHEO”) to conduct a periodic stress
test to measure risk in Government Sponsored Entities (“GSEs”):
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 161 Although these tests have been
ongoing, they failed (to say the least) in predicting the catastrophic
insolvencies of both these entities. 162 This failure was attributable to
159. See, e.g., Exercise Stress Test, MEDLINE PLUS (June 18, 2012), http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
medlineplus/ency/article/003878.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/9D34-DBR3.
160. For an analysis of the history of stress testing, see Weber, supra note 17, at 2280–84.
161. Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 §§ 1311, 1361, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4511,
4611 (2012).
162. While the OFHEO supervised these GSEs, it
was required to develop a risk-based capital regulation based on a stress test. The
model and risk-
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shortcomings in the testers’ model, which used historical data in their
hypothetical scenarios, as well as the success of the GSEs in
persuading their regulators to minimize “stress” situations to avoid
increased capital requirements that they argued would reduce their
return on equity.163
Financial firms’ adoption of stress testing can be linked to Long
Term Capital Management (LTCM), a large hedge fund that achieved
phenomenal success for a time by using highly leveraged investments
based on mathematical models of risk. 164 The firm was supposed to
represent the future of finance: using complex models, specifically the
Nobel Prize–winning Scholes-Merton model, to ward off risks. 165
At the same time as returns were being boosted by bigger balance sheets and financed
by higher leverage, risk was being held in check by a shift in the technological frontier
of risk management. A new era had dawned, one with simultaneously higher return and

owing to the struggles of the new agency, the complexity of the stress test, and the
institutions viewed as crucial to the U.S. housing sector. Nevertheless, once in effect,
the stress test was hailed as “state of the art” and as a mechanism to ensure that the
if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could meet the OFHEO risk-based capital stress test,
their risk of insolvency was “effectively zero.”
W. SCOTT FRAME, CHRISTOPHER GERARDI & PAUL S. WILLEN, SUPERVISORY STRESS TESTS, MODEL
RISK, AND MODEL DISCLOSURE: LESSONS FROM THE OFHEO 2 (2013); see also JOHN WEICHER,
REFORM OF THE HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM 3 (2010) (“[T]he new financial safety and soundness
regulator (OFHEO) spent more than five years putting it in place and evaluating the GSEs. Then
it turned out that the enacted stress test was so weak that the required capital level to be
‘adequately capitalized’ was less than the 2.5% minimum capital . . . .”).
163. Weber describes the reasons for the failure of these stress tests:
(1) OFHEO, [the regulator], not the GSEs, is responsible for conducting the test so no
local knowledge is harnessed and corporate governance is unaffected; (2) the test is
applied with respect to the GSEs’ asset portfolios as they exist at a fixed point in time;
(3) the variables that are stressed and, in many cases, the methodologies by which
they are stressed, are also fixed, specified in FHEFSSA itself; (4) the stress scenarios
are drawn from historical precedents, meaning that the stress test assumes, at least
with respect to any single variable, that the worst is in the past; (5) variables are
isolated and they do not interact dynamically; and (6) the outcome of the test is a
binary pass-fail verification that does not prompt further action. Moreover, by tying
the stress test exercise directly to a capital adequacy regime that required compliance
with precise rules, Congress entrenched an adversarial, top-down regulatory
relationship. OFHEO’s responses to the GSEs’ comments, published in the Federal
Register, reflect a consistently adversarial relationship in which the GSEs, perceiving
that increases to capital requirements would reduce their return on equity, advocated
at nearly every juncture for the attenuation of the stressed conditions used in the tests.
“Stress” was a periodically negotiated event rather than a continuous subject of
deliberation within the firm and between the firm and its regulators. During these
one-off negotiations, the regulator was deliberating on stressed conditions, and the
regulated entity minimized threats in order to achieve lower capital requirements.
Weber, supra note 17, at 2283–84.
164. Xiaowei Guo, The Fall of Long-Term Capital Management, 1 J. BANKING, FIN. & ECON.
1, 2–3 (2008).
165. Id.
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lower risk. This miracle came care of a compelling combination of cavalier risk-takers
and roundhead risk-managers. Or so ran the rhetoric. 166

However, their modeling failed. In 1998, the firm lost $4.6 billion in
four months due to bad investments in Asian markets. The FRB bailed
out the fund. It was the first TBTF firm bailed out by the federal
government, with more to come. 167
During this era of high leverage and high profits, regulators
mostly stayed on the sidelines. Any regulatory involvement with stress
testing during this time involved regulators recommending that firms
conduct them. For example, in 1993, the OCC, faced with the
proliferation of complex derivatives transactions, directed bank
management to “facilitate stress testing” in order to “evaluate risk
exposures under various scenarios that represent a broad range of
potential market movements and corresponding price behaviors and
that consider historical and recent market trends.”168
The next year, the Basel Committee recommended the use of
stress testing to assess the effect on bank balance sheets of
hypothetical future adverse events. 169 Basel II again required banks to
have in place “sound stress testing practices” that identify
“unfavorable effects on a bank’s credit exposures.” 170 Even so, in 2006,
during the early phase of the financial crisis, an FRB survey of bank
stress-testing practices found that “there was neither a well-developed
set of best practices nor supervisory guidance in this area at the
time.” 171 The study concluded:
[N]one of the institutions had an integrated stress testing program that incorporated all
major financial risks enterprise-wide, nor did they test for scenarios that would render

166. Haldane, supra note 5, at 4.
167. Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement: What Led to the Financial Meltdown, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Jan. 2, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/magazine/04riskt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/X2ZH-9DPQ.
168. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANKING CIRCULAR NO. 277, RISK
MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (1993). The OCC followed up in 1996 with another
push toward stress testing designed to “evaluate the bank’s exposure in a highly stressed market
scenario.” OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BULLETIN 1996-43, CREDIT
DERIVATIVES (1996), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/1996/bulletin1996-43.html, archived at http://perma.cc/PF8B-JLRL.
169. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR
DERIVATIVES ¶ III.6 (1994), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc211.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/RS8Y-KP5Z.
170. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra, note 67, at 96.
171. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-499T, FINANCIAL REGULATION: REVIEW OF
REGULATORS’ OVERSIGHT OF RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AT A LIMITED NUMBER OF LARGE,
COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 23 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09499T, archived at http://perma.cc/32SK-8QBV.
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them insolvent. [Instead,] institutions were stress testing the impact of adverse events
on individual products and business lines rather than on the institution as a whole. 172

Federal Reserve officials stated that “the current crisis had gone
beyond what they had contemplated for a worst-case scenario,
and . . . that they would probably have faced significant resistance had
they tried to require the institutions to do stress tests for scenarios
such as downgrades in counterparties’ credit ratings because such
scenarios appeared unlikely.” 173
Dodd-Frank, for the first time, codifies stress tests of financial
institutions as a mandatory and recurrent feature of bank supervision.
The regulatory purpose of these tests is two-fold. First, they are
diagnostic. According to the Federal Reserve, these tests “are intended
to provide BHC management and boards of directors, the public, and
supervisors with forward-looking information to help identify
downside risks and the potential effect of adverse conditions on capital
adequacy of these large banking organizations.” 174 Second, the stress
tests’ results will drive the design of future regulation. The FRB states
that stress testing is “a valuable supervisory tool that provides a
forward-looking assessment of large financial institutions’ capital
adequacy under hypothetical economic and financial market
conditions.” 175
As mentioned above, prior to passage of the Act, stress testing
in banks was, at most, recommended by regulators but conducted by
the banks themselves. Dodd-Frank now requires the Federal Reserve
to perform stress tests of systemically important firms. 176 The FRB’s
new regulation YY—referred to as “Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests” or
“DFASTs”—was codified in 2011 and requires the FRB to conduct
annual stress testing of “covered companies.” 177 Covered companies
include banks with consolidated assets over $50 billion and FSOC-

172. Id.
173. Id. at 23–24.
174. FED. RESERVE, DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TEST 2013: SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 3 (2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/bcreg/dfast_2013_results_20130314.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3PG3-PJGU.
175. Official Board Commentary on Regulation II, 12 C.F.R. § 252 app. A (2014).
176. The Dodd-Frank Act requires all financial companies that have more than $10 billion in
total consolidated assets and are regulated by a federal financial regulatory agency to conduct
capital stress tests at least annually. The Federal Reserve finalized those requirements for BHCs
with between $10 billion and $50 billion in assets and state member banks and savings and loan
holding companies with over $10 billion in assets on October 9, 2012. See 12 C.F.R § 252.132
(2014).
177. Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests, THE FEDERAL RESERVE (June 17, 2014), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/dfa-stress-tests.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/FC2F2ZD3.
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designated “systemically significant” institutions. 178 Dodd-Frank also
mandates that covered companies conduct their own semiannual
stress tests using the same scenarios assessed by the FRB itself, and a
“mid-cycle” stress test using other adverse scenarios. 179 The FRB
conducted its first tests in April 2009. In 2011 and in 2012, the FRB
conducted a Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR),
which was similar to a stress test but with a narrower focus of
determining whether the firms had enough capital to withstand an
adverse economic scenario. 180 Full-scale FRB stress testing occurred
again in 2013. 181
During the tests, the Federal Reserve posited adverse financial
scenarios that included lowered housing prices, increased
unemployment, and a dip in the GDP, among other factors. 182 These
scenarios were intended to highlight vulnerabilities in each firm and
to ensure that firms had enough Tier 1 capital to buffer their potential
losses without becoming insolvent.183 Firms that failed the tests were
required to raise more capital either on the private market or through
arrangements made with the FRB itself. 184
The stress tests were envisioned as a diagnostic endeavor to
determine which firms could withstand the next crisis and which could
not. However, the tests and their results quickly became a way for the
Federal Reserve to calm the markets and restore confidence in the
banking system, which is a major aspect of the FRB’s dual role. 185
Thus, in 2009, after the first round of stress tests, the FRB publicized

178. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a) & (i)(1) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 252.132(e).
179. See 12 C.F.R. § 252.144(b); id. § 252.145(b); Supervisory and Company-Run Stress Test
Requirements for Covered Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,378, 62,387 (Oct. 12, 2012) (“For the
annual stress test, covered companies will use the same scenarios as the Board will use for its
supervisory stress analysis.”).
180. Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review, THE FEDERAL RESERVE (June 24, 2014),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/ccar.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/4SFA-HKCK.
181. Press Release, The Fed. Reserve, Stress Test Methodology and Results (Mar. 7, 2013),
available at, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20130307a.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/8RXQ-NF7B.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Alexander Abramovich, Comparative Analysis of Stress Testing in the United States and
Europe, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 333, 338–39 (2011). See generally Andru E. Wall, Stress Tests &
Market Discipline, 30 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1 (2011) (analyzing whether
transparent bank stress tests can improve market conduct).
185. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: STRESS TESTING AND SHORING
UP BANK CAPITAL 10-26, B-1 (2009); Edmund L. Andrews & Eric Dash, U.S. Government Offers
Details of Bank Stress Test, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/
business/economy/26banks.html?_r=0, archived at http:// perma.cc/Y9R9-5EDG.
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the results, though not the methodology. 186 The market quickly
reacted, and the stock price of each of the passing firms increased,
some by as much as ninety-five percent. 187 Releasing the methodology
of the stress tests would make the tests more effective by allowing
industry experts to expose weaknesses in the models. However, if the
methodology was released and criticized by experts, the marketcalming objective would not be met. In the alternative, regulators could
conduct stress tests and not release the results at all, which would not
calm markets but could lead to more rigorous stress testing geared
toward diagnosing weakness.
B. SCAP vs. CCAR
The FRB has conducted two “Supervisory Capital Assessment
Programs” (“SCAPs”) exercises thus far: one in 2009 and one in
2013. 188 In addition, the FRB conducted two Comprehensive Capital
Analysis and Reviews (“CCARs”) in 2011 and 2012. 189 According to the
FRB, SCAP was designed to “help[ ] bank supervisors measure
whether a Bank Holding Company (‘BHC’) has enough capital to
support its operations throughout periods of stress.” 190 The CCAR is “a
supervisory assessment by the Federal Reserve of the capital planning
processes and capital adequacy of large, complex, bank holding
companies.” Furthermore, it is “the central element of the Federal
186. The FRB has released the rough outlines of its testing methodology and has explained
that it used its own models in determining outcomes. However, the FRB has not released the
details of its models or how those models were applied to individual banks.
187. Wall, supra, note 184, at 1–2 (noting that credit default swap spreads also increased for
four banks, indicating more confidence in the banks as a result of the stress tests).
188. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL ASSESSMENT
PROGRAM: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION (2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
bankinforeg/bcreg20090424a1.pdf; archived at http://perma.cc/ 4UQD-VBFP [hereinafter SCAP
DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION]; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE
CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2013: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS (2013), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/ccar-2013-results-20130314.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/U9WU-8HVW [hereinafter 2013 CCAR ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK].
189. SCAP DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION, supra, note 188; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW: OBJECTIVES AND OVERVIEW,
(2011), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20110318a1.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/5LX4-32T6 [hereinafter 2011 CCAR OBJECTIVES]; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2012: METHODOLOGY AND
RESULTS FOR STRESS SCENARIO PROJECTIONS (2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20120313a1.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/JHQ3-K9HF
[hereinafter 2012 CCAR METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS]; 2013 CCAR ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK,
supra, note 188.
190. FED. RESERVE, DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TEST 2014: SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 1 (2014), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/nesevents/
press/bcreg/bcreg20140320a1.pdf, archived at http:// perma.cc/524T-UGG8.
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Reserve’s approach to ensuring that large BHCs have thorough and
robust processes for managing their capital resources, supported by
effective risk measurement and risk management practices.” 191 The
SCAP and CCAR are similar in purpose, and starting in 2014, the
CCAR Program will be subsumed into the 2014 Capital Plan Review
program, which will apply in an identical manner to all covered
companies. 192
Although both exercises measure the same thing (capital
adequacy) at the same firms (large BHCs), they function in different
ways. Within the framing of hypothetical regulation, SCAPs fit into
the new frontier of regulator-designed hypothetical testing, and CCAR
is only an extension of already functioning risk management protocols.
For SCAP, “the Federal Reserve uses a standardized set of capital
action assumptions that are specified in the Dodd-Frank stress test
rules,” which are created by the regulator. 193
In measuring how firm balance sheets will react to hypothetical
stress, both exercises use a common formula across firms that is based
on what similar firms have done in the past.194 The FRB takes this
approach because it admits that future capital actions are
“uncertain.” 195 For the CCAR, the FRB uses a BHC’s own planned
capital actions to assess whether the “BHC would be capable of
meeting supervisory expectations for minimum capital ratios if
stressful conditions emerged.” 196 In other words, with SCAP, the FRB

191. 2012 CCAR METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS, supra note 189, at 4.
192. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS
AND REVIEW 2014: SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS AND GUIDANCE 1–2 (2013) [hereinafter 2014 CCAR
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/
INSTRUCTIONS],
bcreg20131101a2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9TWY-92T7.
193. BD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND
REVIEW 2014: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 21, box 3 (2014), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcred/ccar20140326.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/NY7Y-45W9.
194. Id. The formula assumes that common stock dividends are consistent from last year,
scheduled payments on capital instruments “eligible for inclusion in the numerator of a
regulatory capital ratio” are paid, and there are no repurchases of common stock. Finally, the
assumptions do not factor in issuances “of new common stock, preferred stock, or other
instrument that would be included in regulatory capital, except for common stock issuance
associated with expensed employee compensation.” Id. at 21 box 3 & n.2.
195. See id. (“[F]uture capital actions . . . will not be reflected in a company’s projected
regulatory capital for the purpose of the company-run stress tests because of the uncertainty of
these actions.”).
196. Id. at box 3. The FRB states that the CCAR “focuses on the risk management and
management practices supporting organizations’ capital adequacy assessments, including their
ability to deliver credible inputs to their loss estimation techniques, as well as the governance
processes around capital planning practices.” Policy Statement on the Scenario Design
Framework for Stress Testing, 12 C.F.R. § 252 app. A (2014).
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predicts how capital might be used and depleted while, with CCARs, it
defers to the firms’ own statements and plans to determine whether
capital will remain sufficient. This Article focuses on SCAPs because
they represented an unalloyed adoption of regulation by hypothetical.
C. SCAP Methodology
The FRB designed SCAP to collect as much information as
possible about each firm’s loss rates and resource availability, thereby
illuminating potential losses and revenues for weaker-than-expected
economic conditions. 197 The first SCAP implementation involved over
150 examiners and economists. 198 For this first round of SCAP testing
in 2009, the selected BHCs estimated potential losses on a variety of
assets and trading positions 199 under two alternative macroeconomic
scenarios. The BHCs also projected the resources they believed were
available to absorb losses over two years under both macroeconomic
scenarios. 200
Teams of regulators evaluated categories of assets, revenues,
and reserves, and “engaged with the firms . . . to obtain additional
information necessary to support the firms’ estimates.”201 These
regulators also reviewed and evaluated each firm’s quantitative
methods, which the firms had used to project losses and resources to
create key assumptions. 202 The FRB took these actions to create a
picture of each firm’s portfolio, underwriting practices, and risk
management practices, although no actual interviews or evaluations
of individuals at the firms were conducted. 203 To ensure consistency
across all firms, the teams used a single, unitary quantitative method
to evaluate all the firms’ estimates.204

197. SCAP DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 188, at 11.
198. The Federal Reserve released a white paper describing the methodology and
implementation of its SCAP program. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Board Publishes White Paper on Process and Methodologies Employed by Federal Banking
Supervisory Agencies in Capital Assessment of Large U.S. Bank Holding Companies (Apr. 24,
2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20090424a.htm
archived at, http://perma.cc/QXF7-DPLB.
199. Such as “loans, securities, and trading positions, as well as pre-provision net revenue
(PPNR) and the resources available from the allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL).” SCAP
DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 188, at 4.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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In 2009, the FRB team used two scenarios to conduct the stress
tests: a baseline scenario and a more adverse scenario. 205 The two
scenarios were meant to mimic recessionary conditions and took into
account general macroeconomic factors, with an emphasis on local
housing prices because of banks’ recent, heavy mortgage lending. The
baseline projection built on forecasts made in 2009 by a group of
professional economists that reflected their “consensus view about the
depth and duration of the recession.” 206 The more adverse scenario was
not intended to be a realistic assessment of what would likely happen,
but rather what could happen if the recession was longer and deeper
than anticipated. The more adverse scenario “reflected the possibility
that the economy could turn out to be appreciably weaker than
expected under the baseline outlook.” 207 The FRB designed the test to
“reflect conditions that are severe but plausible.” 208
The firms’ balance sheets were divided into several categories
and the banks were asked to estimate their projected losses under all
of the selected classes of loans, under both the baseline and more
adverse scenarios. 209 The FRB determined projected losses using a
205. See id. at 5 (describing the two scenarios).
206. Id. The baseline scenario was consistent with projections from the Consensus Forecasts,
the Blue Chip survey, and the Survey of Professional Forecasters, and was designed to show a
consensus of the recession’s duration and depth. In addition, the FRB states that “the
assumptions for house prices in the baseline economic outlook are consistent with the path that
was implied by future prices for the Case-Shiller 10-city Composite index in late February and
the average response to a special question on house prices in the Blue Chip survey.” Id. However,
for the more adverse scenario, house prices were held to be ten percent lower at the end of 2010.
Id.
207. Id. The Federal Reserve never claimed its economic predictions would be inerrant,
instead contending the predictions could be helpful to get a broad view of risk. See id. at 10 (“The
future path of GDP growth, unemployment, and home prices . . . are unknown, with a wide range
of plausible outcomes . . . this type of exercise can be extremely useful in helping . . . understand
a BHC’s risk, especially in periods of high uncertainty.”); see also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: OVERVIEW OF RESULTS 2
(2009) (“The estimates are not forecasts or expected outcomes; they are the product of a two-yearahead ‘what if’ exercise . . . .”).
208. SCAP DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 188, at 5. The FRB report states that:
The “more adverse” scenario was constructed from the historical track record of
private forecasters as well as their current assessments of uncertainty. In particular,
based on the historical accuracy of Blue Chip forecasts made since the late 1970s, the
likelihood that the average unemployment rate in 2010 could be at least as high as in
the alternative more adverse scenario is roughly [ten] percent. In addition, the
subjective probability assessments provided by participants in the January Consensus
Forecasts survey and the February Survey of Professional Forecasters imply a roughly
[fifteen] percent change that real GDP growth could be at least as low, and
unemployment at least as high, as assumed in the more adverse scenario.
Id. at 5 n.3.
209. SCAP DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 188, at 12–15. The supervisory teams,
made up of “senior examiners, economists, and financial analysts,” compiled data into five
distinct categories: (1) consumer lending: first and second lien mortgages; credit cards and other
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variety of methods but mainly analyzed historical losses experienced
at large BHCs. 210 The FRB report admits the drawbacks of relying on
historical models for housing losses, noting that “historical loss
experience at BHCs may not be a reliable guide to future performance
under the baseline or more adverse scenario, given the path of home
prices in recent years.” 211 The statement doesn’t address why historical
loss experience has predictive value for any of the other categories.
The second round of SCAP, executed in 2013, tracked the FRB’s
2009 approach but added a new requirement that banks run their own
tests in addition to the Federal Reserve tests. 212 In addition—and of
particular importance to this Article—regulators used a new “severely
adverse” scenario that, along with the baseline and adverse scenario,
brought into play more variables than the original 2009 SCAP. 213 This
new methodology was developed in response to criticisms that the
adverse scenario in 2009 was not adverse enough. The additional
variables incorporated into the “severely adverse” scenario included
problems in the E.U. and a deeper recession than was modeled in
2009. 214 In the severely adverse scenario, from the third quarter of
2012 to the end of 2013, real GDP declines nearly five percent,
unemployment increases to twelve percent, and the Consumer Price
Index slows to one percent. 215 Equities drop more than fifty percent,
and equity market volatility increases from twenty-one to seventy. 216
consumer loans; (2) commercial lending: commercial and industrial loans, commercial real estate
loans; (3) counterparty transactions: securities in AFS and HTM portfolios, trading portfolio
losses, counterparty credit risk, pre-provision net revenue, and allowances for loan and lease
losses; (4) net revenue—that is, “net revenue before adjusting for loss provisions”; and (5) in
allowance for lease and loss gains the teams assessed the level of reserves needed at the end of
the scenario. Id.; Pre-Provision Net Revenue Definition, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/
investing/glossary/p/pre-provision-net-revenue#provision, archived at http://perma.cc/828XATMS.
210. FED. RESERVE, supra note 174, at 8.
211. Id.
212. SCAP DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 188, at 1–5. Another difference is that in
the 2009 SCAP “[a]ll domestic BHCs with year-end 2008 assets exceeding $100 billion were
required to participate.” Id. The 2013 SCAP investigated any BHC “with $50 billion or more in
total consolidated assets and nonbank financial companies designated by the FSOC for Federal
Reserve supervision.” FED. RESERVE, supra note 174 at 9.
213. FED. RESERVE, supra note 174, at 3–5 (describing the changes).
214. Id. at 7. There were twenty-six variables; fourteen of these variables captured “economic
activity, asset activity, and interest rates in the U.S. economy,” while the remainder contained
three variables of “real GDP growth, inflation, and the U.S./foreign currency exchange rate” in
“the euro area, the United Kingdom, developing Asia, and Japan.”
215. Id. In comparison, under the “more adverse” scenario of the 2009 SCAP, GDP declines
only 3.3 percent from the end of 2008 to the third quarter of 2009, unemployment rises to 10.3
percent, and housing prices decline more than 20 percent through 2010. SCAP DESIGN &
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 188, at 6–7.
216. SCAP DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 188, 7.
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“House prices decline more than 20 percent by the end of 2014, and
commercial real estate prices fall by a similar amount.”217 Finally, the
international component “features recessions in the euro area, the
United Kingdom, and Japan and below-trend growth in developing
Asia.” 218
In 2014, stress tests revealed an interesting new function. The
FRB objected to five capital plans. Four of these rejections were on
qualitative grounds (Citi, RBS, Santander, and HSBC), and one was
on quantitative grounds (Zions). In explaining the Citigroup failure,
the FRB reported:
While Citigroup has made considerable progress in improving its general riskmanagement and control practices over the past several years, its 2014 capital plan
reflected a number of deficiencies in its capital planning practices, including in some
areas that had been previously identified by supervisors as requiring attention, but for
which there was not sufficient improvement. Practices with specific deficiencies included
Citigroup’s ability to project revenue and losses under a stressful scenario for material
parts of the firm’s global operations, and its ability to develop scenarios for its internal
stress testing that adequately reflect and stress its full range of business activities and
exposures. Taken in isolation, each of the deficiencies would not have been deemed
critical enough to warrant an objection, but, when viewed together, they raise sufficient
concerns regarding the overall reliability of Citigroup’s capital planning process to
warrant an objection to the capital plan and require a resubmission. 219

Citi had requested an increase in its dividend from $0.01 to
$0.05 and a $6.4 billion share repurchase. 220 The FRB objected to the
plans because, among other things, the banks were unable to project
losses and revenues under stress scenarios. 221 So the FRB actually
restricted distributions based on a procedural objection to their stress
testing capabilities. This could be encouraging news that the FRB is
taking its risk management oversight responsibilities more seriously
and may have learned its lesson. On the other hand, the stress tests
are not only about disclosure—they also activate real levers of state
power. Now, well-capitalized BHCs can distribute property to
stockholders (even to preferred stockholders) only with FRB approval,
which had never been the case before. Dividends have been made
contingent and contestable to an unprecedented degree. Dividend
restrictions are as old as U.S. banking law. But these restrictions are,
perhaps, dividend restrictions by hypothetical. This type of restriction
looks a lot like a central bank overseeing a utility rather than a private
217. Id.
218. Id. at 8.
219. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 193, at 7 (emphasis added).
220. Matthew Boesler, Citi Fails Fed Stress Test, Stock Tanks, BUS. INSIDER SINGAPORE
(Mar. 26, 2014, 4:07 AM), http://www.businessinsider.sg/citi-fails-fed-stress-test-stock-tanks2014-3/#.U-fBVhaN6fM, archived at http://perma.cc/XZ4P-HFWU.
221. Id.
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bank. Could this mean that regulation by hypothetical, if administered
conservatively, moves regulation towards utility banking?
D. The Hypothetical
The foundation of this new regulatory frontier is, of course, a
hypothetical. In order for a stress test or a living will to accurately
predict possible outcomes, regulators must present a hypothetical
scenario that is realistic, thorough, and sufficiently adverse. Firms
have been constructing hypothetical models for internal risk
management for decades, and the FRB’s hypothetical was built using
general industry standards. There are two methods for risk modeling:
(1) using historical data to build a model for possible adverse outcomes
and (2) Monte Carlo modeling, which is more of a randomized sampling
of risk. Historical models are much more prevalent.
To illustrate the difference, imagine a weather prediction
scenario. In order to predict and prepare for snowfall in Atlanta in
February, a historical model predicts future snowfall based on average
snowfall in the past. In a historically based simulation, firms account
for risks that have occurred in the past and favor those risks in their
models. For example, an adverse recessionary hypothetical looks at all
past recessions and the market events that ensued and includes those
events in their model in order to determine how well a firm might fare
if those events occurred again. Regulators can also intensify stressors
in increasingly adverse scenarios. For example, in a hypothetical
adverse scenario, unemployment would be nine percent. In a severely
adverse scenario, unemployment would be twelve percent. Most
models are considered successful if the severely adverse scenario
produces larger hypothetical losses than a baseline or adverse
scenario. However, historical data is limited in that, if an event has
not happened in the past, the model cannot gauge its effects in the
future. For example, there is no model that can accurately predict the
broad market effects of thirty percent unemployment because it is
historically unprecedented—there is no data for such an event. The
model would have to assume that the loss would somehow correlate
with unemployment data that exists. But would thirty percent
unemployment just result in triple the losses as ten percent
unemployment, or would it cause a chain reaction across other
markets, resulting in unprecedented losses in, for example, consumer
spending, credit, and GDP?
In Monte Carlo modeling, historical data is still used to define
the high and low parameters, but a variety of possibilities are chosen
at random. A computer model randomly chooses among a range of past
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possibilities, and repeats the process until an adequate sample is
attained. When modeling for market risks, a Monte Carlo model treats
all risks as having the same probability or recurrence and runs many
simulations of possible risks to collect a random sampling of
possibilities. However, the Monte Carlo model is still limited by
historical possibilities in inputting data. For example, the model would
not consider or prepare for a snowfall that has not happened in the
past—let’s say two feet per day of snowfall for the entire month. Such
an event could create significant problems, but it would be difficult to
prepare for them because the event and its aftermath are
unprecedented.
Monte Carlo modeling has the advantage of including a bigger
scope of risk, but it is limited in its predictive ability. The model still
uses available data for its simulations, it just uses the data differently
than historically based simulations. For instance, a Monte Carlo model
could attempt to model thirty percent unemployment, but it could not
accurately predict the results of such unemployment because, like
historically based simulation, Monte Carlo modeling operates under
limited data. Monte Carlo modeling is also much more difficult and
time-consuming because it has to generate many scenarios in order to
have a large enough data sample. Thus, most firm models use
historical data, and therefore, most firm models cannot accurately
predict scenarios that have not happened historically.
This is the significant problem of the hypothetical regime: it can
prepare firms for cyclical market problems, but it cannot prepare them
for unprecedented market occurrences. This is not to say that these
hypotheticals are useless but that we need to understand their limits.
There are many correlations whose modeling is worthwhile. Markets
are cyclical, and firms must be prepared to withstand run-of-the-mill
market problems. However, financial crises are usually not caused by
mundane market occurrences.
In designing the 2013 SCAP hypothetical, the FRB considered
historically based simulations and other “probabilistic approaches,”
such as Monte Carlo, which would “construct a forecast from a largescale macroeconomic model and identify a scenario that would have a
specific probabilistic likelihood.” 222 The FRB publicized its process of
selecting operative variables. Ultimately, in designing the baseline,
adverse, and severely adverse hypotheticals, the Federal Reserve
relied on historical data:
In general, the baseline scenario will reflect the most recently available consensus views
of the macroeconomic outlook expressed by professional forecasters, government

222. Id.
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agencies, and other public-sector organizations as of the beginning of the annual stresstest cycle. The severely adverse scenario will consist of a set of economic and financial
conditions that reflect the conditions of post-war U.S. recessions. The adverse scenario
will consist of a set of economic and financial conditions that are more adverse than those
associated with the baseline scenario but less severe than those associated with the
severely adverse scenario.” 223

In deciding in favor of the historic approach, the FRB rejected
the purely mathematical risk modeling approach based on randomly
generated scenarios, instead adopting a simpler alternative that is less
complex but inherently limited in scope. The hypotheticals, therefore,
focus on scenarios that involve recessions of varying degrees that
resemble past recessions. The FRB explains that a “scenario featuring
a recession may be somewhat clearer and more straightforward to
communicate,” and the “probabilistic approach relies on estimates of
uncertainty around the baseline scenario and such estimates are in
practice model-dependent.” 224 The FRB is in line with the industry in
their preference of a more realistic, easy-to-administer, historically
based hypothetical over the more complex Monte Carlo mathematical
models.
To counteract the problem of the limited scope of historical
data, the FRB intends to account for more and more possible risks as
they present themselves in real time. Thus, in addition to the fixed
scenarios, which are mainly focused on GDP and unemployment risks,
the FRB states that it will add a “salient risk” category each year that
will use current conditions to anticipate possible risks to the banking
sector. 225 The FRB admits, however, that this will be difficult when
223. Policy Statement on the Scenario Design Framework for Stress Testing, 12 C.F.R. § 252
app. A (2014):
This approach requires consideration of the type of recession to feature. All post-war
U.S. recessions have not been identical: some recessions have been associated with
very elevated interest rates, some have been associated with sizable asset price
declines, and some have been relatively more global. The most common features of
recessions, however, are increases in the unemployment rate and contractions in
aggregate incomes and economic activity. For this and the following reasons, the Board
intends to use the unemployment rate as the primary basis for specifying the severely
adverse scenario. First, the unemployment rate is likely the most representative single
summary indicator of adverse economic conditions. Second, in comparison to GDP,
labor market data have traditionally featured more prominently than GDP in the set
of indicators that the National Bureau of Economic Research reviews to inform its
recession dates. Third and finally, the growth rate of potential output can cause the
size of the decline in GDP to vary between recessions. While changes in the
unemployment rate can also vary over time due to demographic factors, this seems to
have more limited implications over time relative to changes in potential output
growth. The unemployment rate used in the severely adverse scenario will reflect an
unemployment rate that has been observed in severe post-war U.S. recessions,
measuring severity by the absolute level of and relative increase in the unemployment
rate.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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economic conditions are buoyant as “a boom can obscure the
weaknesses present in the system.”226
1. Weakness of Stress Tests
a. Not Adverse Enough
Many commenters claimed that the FRB’s 2009 stress tests
were not stringent enough—with an open question as to whether they
were purposefully so. 227 A 2009 Saturday Night Live sketch mocked
Tim Geithner’s announcement about the stress test results:
Initially, my department had planned to give each bank a numerical grade of 1 to 100—
100 being a perfect score. But then we decided that might unfairly stigmatize banks who
scored low on the test because they followed reckless lending practices or were otherwise
not good at banking. So we changed to a simple “PASS/FAIL” system. However, on
reflection, a few of us felt that THAT system was too rigid, so we changed it once again
to “PASS/PASS.*” This seemed less judgmental and more inclusive. Eventually, at the
banks’ suggestion, we dropped the asterisk and went with a “PASS/PASS” system.
Tonight, I am proud to say that, after the written tests were examined, every one of the
nineteen banks scored a “PASS”! Congratulations, banks! 228

The question of whether the soft test was on purpose implicates the
problematic dual role of the FRB as systemic risk regulator as well as
marketmaker, which involves assuring trust in financial markets. Was
the intent of the tests to assure markets or to test accurately firm
vulnerabilities? If regulators view these tests as a means of calming
the markets, there is an inherent incentive to go light on “adverse”
conditions. For example, the “more adverse” scenario used in February
2009, which was billed as being “unlikely,” did not look unlikely at all
by the fall of 2009. 229 These regulatory incentives should not be
ignored.

226. Id.
227. David Wessel, Bank Checkup Also Tests Regulators, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 2009, 12:01
AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123983475012122683.html; see also David Ellis, Watchdog
Wants Stress Test Do-Over, CNN (June 9, 2009, 6:48 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/06/09/
news/companies/tests_warren/, archived at http://perma.cc/B9S7-T6ZR (“[T]he Congressional
Oversight Panel pointed to the unemployment report for the month of May as a sign that the
stress tests were not stressful enough.”); Gretchen Morgenson, Stress Tests are Over. The Stress
Isn’t, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/10/business/10gret.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/K3C4-FTZG (“The government tests were, in truth, not exceedingly
tough. And some of the program’s ‘adverse’ scenarios look more like a day at the beach.”).
228. Season 34, Episode 21: A Special Address from the Secretary of the Treasury, SNL
TRANSCRIPTS, http://snltranscripts.jt.org/08/08ugeithner.phtml, archived at http://perma.cc/R79RCHZ (last visited Sept. 3, 2014).
229. Ellis, supra note 227 (“[T]he unemployment rate surged to a 26-year high of 9.45.
Banking regulators that devised the stress tests had said in their most ‘adverse’ case scenario
that the jobless rate would hit 8.9% in 2009.”).
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European regulators had similar conflicts that became starkly
apparent in their stress testing, which was modeled after the FRB
stress tests. The mismatch of regulatory incentives in the European
regulators’ stress tests produced such inaccurate results that
commentators deemed them all but useless. In 2010, the Committee of
European Bank Supervisors “gave a clean bill of health to all but seven
of the 91 banks that were tested, identifying an aggregate capital
shortfall of only €3.5 billion.” 230 These test results immediately led to
a positive market response. However, within four months, two of the
Irish banks that passed the tests required rescuing by various state
and international groups, resulting in roughly €35 Billion in capital
allocations and bailout funds. Dexia, a Franco-Belgian bank, which the
stress tests suggested was in good shape, in fact was in deep trouble
just three months later. 231 Greek and Spanish banks also passed the
tests only to fall into unprecedented distress only months later. 232
Cyprian banks passed the E.U. regulator conducted stress tests in
2010 and 2011 and failed shortly thereafter. 233
One stated reason for these results was that “the tests modeled
the impact of the economy on loan portfolios but didn’t contemplate the
possibility that government bonds could produce losses.” 234 Failing to
account for government bond failure was not merely an oversight but
an illustrative example of the conflicting dual role of regulators who
are conducting the tests as well as attempting to calm markets. The
European Banking authority “stopped short of applying market
230. Patrick Jenkins & Brooke Masters, Bank Watchdog Sets Out to Square the Circle, FIN.
TIMES
(Feb.
14,
2011),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d70dd886-3865-11e0-959c00144feabdc0.html#axzz2VMLLyFqf, archived at http://perma.cc/U4W9-6HAA.
231. Greek Debt Crisis Leads to Dexia Bank Failure, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, (Oct. 11, 2011, 3:00
PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/10/11/141246687/greek-debt-crisis-leads-to-dexia-fail, archived at
http://perma.cc/G82G-XPNN.
232. See David Enrich, New Doubts on EU Bank Stress Tests, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 20, 2010,
12:01
AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704720004575377202517842246.html.
233. COMM. OF EUR. BANKING SUPERVISORS, AGGREGATE OUTCOME OF THE 2011 E.U.-WIDE
STRESS TEST EXERCISE COORDINATED BY CEB IN COOPERATION WITH THE ECB: SUMMARY REPORT
(2011),
available
at
http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/15935/
EBA_ST_2011_Summary_Report_v6.pdf/54a9ec8e-3a44-449f-9a5f-e820cc2c2f0a, archived at
http://perma.cc/M44A-GBQG; COMM. OF EUR. BANKING SUPERVISORS, AGGREGATE OUTCOME OF
THE 2010 E.U.-WIDE STRESS TEST EXERCISE COORDINATED BY CEB IN COOPERATION WITH THE
ECB: SUMMARY REPORT (2010), available at http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/15938/
Summaryreport.pdf/95030af2-7b52-4530-afe1-f067a895d163, archived at http://perma.cc/JH3XT9G4; Landon Thomas Jr., Calculating the Impact of Cyprus’ Bailout, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/business/global/calculating-impact-of-cypruss-bankbailout.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&, archived at http://perma.cc/BD3-BUE5?
234. David Enrich, Greek Bets Sank Cyprus’s Top Lenders, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2013, 7:35
PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323501004578386762342123182.html.
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valuations of peripheral sovereign debt—precisely the issue that was
at the heart of investors nervousness about banks’ financial
strength.” 235 This politically driven omission, which was not disclosed,
resulted in false market signaling that concealed the actual state of
the E.U. banks.
b. Snapshot Testing—Too Narrow
Stress tests are too narrowly focused both on a single static
point in time and also on a single data point (a firm’s balance sheet).
Often, a crisis unfolds slowly and firms react to the falling pieces in
sequence. The stress test takes a single snapshot of a future point in
time when an adverse scenario suddenly hits a balance sheet. This
view doesn’t capture the changes that managers could make that
would affect a balance sheet prior to the full realization of the adverse
scenario. Relatedly, the test only captures the balance sheet and not
the reactions of the individuals making decisions about the balance
sheets:
Market crises unfold over a period of time, during which market liquidity may dry out.
Yet most scenario analyses are static in nature, i.e., are one period models and do not
allow for the trading of positions in an environment where liquidity varies from one
period to the next. [Such analyses] assume that events occur simultaneously, and that
the portfolio [being tested] remains constant during the period. The modeling framework
usually does not allow for dynamic hedging or the unwinding of positions. [They] are, by
construction, static. Increasing the risk horizon from one day to ten days, one month, or
one year, does not make the model more dynamic. . . . Clearly, liquidity risk cannot be
factored into this traditional static framework. 236

In addition, the tests have an admittedly narrow focus on
certain types of risk. The FRB states that the stress test should focus
only on “credit risk and market risk—that is, risk of mark-to-market
losses associated with firms’ trading and counterparty positions—and
not on other types of risk, such as liquidity risk or operational risk
unrelated to the macroeconomic environment.”237
c. Market Subsidies
There is something particularly troubling about regulators
using stress tests to calm markets. At best, it is inaccurate—and at
worst deceptive—to calm markets using an unreleased methodology

235. Patrick Jenkins, Why Power Remains Elusive Among the Regulators, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
13, 2011, at 14.
236. MICHEL CROUHY ET AL., RISK MANAGEMENT 240–41 (2001).
237. Policy Statement on the Scenario Design Framework for Stress Testing, 77 Fed. Reg.
70,124, 70,128 (codified with some differences in language at 12 C.F.R. § 252 app. A (2014)).
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that gives firms a clean bill of health when, in fact, they remain as
vulnerable as ever to market stress. Such a tactic endangers safety and
soundness while diminishing incentives for market discipline. But
what is most troublesome from the standpoint of proper governance is
that the clean bill of health is akin to federal regulators standing
behind and insuring these firms. This gesture adds another layer of
federal subsidy to an already heavily subsidized sector. 238 Moral
hazard is rampant in the postcrisis banking world as the government
added the promise of implicit bailouts to explicit deposit insurance.
The stress test regime looks like another layer of government
insurance for these banks if the market is to rely on a regulator’s
diagnosis of a stable and safe banking system.
2. Living Wills
a. Description of Living Wills
Living wills are a response to perhaps the most vexing problem
that emerged from the recent crisis: the realization that certain firms
were too big to fail. TBTF firms endanger the financial sector because
they create moral hazard. Specifically, TBTF firms take undue risks to
generate near-term gains and diminish the capacity of regulators to
assure safety and soundness. Many industry observers from across the
political spectrum have claimed that the only effective reform would
be to break up the banks. 239 However, neither Dodd-Frank nor any
other regulatory measure addresses the “too bigness” of these firms.
Dodd-Frank attempts to address the “to fail” aspect of the TBTF
problem. In particular, Dodd-Frank promoted the use of living wills to
address “the dissatisfaction with widespread bailouts of financial firms
during the recent global financial crisis.” 240 Living wills are designed
to assure “rapid and orderly resolution in the event of material

238. See Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283
(2014).
239. Jeff Kearns & Jesse Hamilton, Fed’s Fisher Urges Bank Breakup Amid Too-Big-To-Fail
‘Injustice,’ BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-25/fed-s-fisherurges-bank-breakup-amid-too-big-to-fail-injustice-.html, archived at http://perma.cc/P3L-3JRR;
Allan Sloan, Are Big Banks Doomed to Fail?, FORTUNE (June 14, 2011, 9:00 AM),
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/14/are-big-banks-doomed-to-fail/; The Dodd-Frank Act:
Too Big Not to Fail, ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21547784,
archived at http://perma.cc/4FK4-NGCT.
240. Adam Feibelman, Living Wills and Pre-Commitment, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 95, 99
(2012).
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financial distress or failure.” 241 These “wills” are similar to
“contingency planning for public emergencies that arise when a
hurricane, earthquake, or other natural disaster strikes.” 242 They are
to be crafted by the firms themselves, subject to review by banking
regulators. 243
As we have seen, section 165 of Dodd-Frank sets up the
supervisory structure for “covered companies.” 244 These companies are
to submit to the FRB, the FDIC, and the FSOC resolution plans, which
must include the following: 245
information regarding the manner and extent to which any
insured depository institution affiliated with the company
is adequately protected from risks arising from the
activities of any nonbank subsidiaries of the company;
full descriptions of the ownership structure, assets,
liabilities, and contractual obligations of the company;
identification of the cross-guarantees tied to different
securities identification of major counterparties, and a
process for determining to whom the collateral of the
company is pledges; and
any other information that the Board of Governors and the
Corporation jointly requires by rule or order. 246
The gathering of these plans is staggered; the largest banks are
required to file first, followed by the rest of the banking sector. 247
241. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 115(d)(1) 12 U.S.C. §
5365(d)(1) (2012).
242. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, CREDIBLE LIVING WILLS: THE FIRST GENERATION, (April
25, 2011), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/37a3a804-6a6c-4e10-a6287a1dbbaece7c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c621815c-9413-436b-91ea3451b2b4cf32/042611_DavisPolkMcKinsey_LivingWills_Whitepaper.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/8JEZ-NLAJ.
243. Simon Johnson, Why Living Wills Fail, ECONOMIX (June 17, 2010, 6:00 AM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/why-living-wills-fail/, archived at http://perma.cc/
7UHY-FB93 (explaining that, in theory, “[n]o one knows their business better than the banks
themselves . . . so they should have the responsibility for explaining how they can close down
their various operations—or perhaps sell more valuable parts while limiting losses for
unprofitable activities”).
244. 12 U.S.C. § 5365. Covered companies are nonbank financial companies that are
supervised by the FRB and bank holding companies with at least $50 billion in assets. 12 C.F.R.
§ 381.2(f)(1) (2014).
245. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(1).
246. Id.
247. Id. § 5365(d)(8) requires the FRB and the FDIC to issue final rules implementing Section
165(d). The first of these rules was released on November 1, 2011. Resolution Plan Required, 12
CFR § 243.3. The rule staggered the submission of annual resolution plans. Institutions that have
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Regulators have required that resolution plans include an executive
summary as well as a strategic analysis “describing the covered
company’s plan for rapid and orderly resolution in the event of
material financial distress and failure.” 248 In creating “credible” living
wills, banks must provide a strategic analysis, which should include:
[D]etailed descriptions of the (i) [k]ey assumptions and supporting analysis underlying
the covered company’s resolution plan, including any assumptions made concerning the
economic or financial conditions that would be present at the time the covered company
sought to implement such plan; (ii) [r]ange of specific actions to be taken by the covered
company to facilitate a rapid and orderly resolution of the covered company, its material
entities, and its critical operations and core business lines in the event of material
financial distress or failure of the covered company; (iii) [f]unding, liquidity and capital
needs of, and resources available to, the covered company and its material entities,
which shall be mapped to its critical operations and core business lines, in the ordinary
course of business and in the event of material financial distress at or failure of the
covered company; (iv) [c]overed company’s strategy for maintaining operations of, and
funding for, the covered company and its material entities, which shall be mapped to its
critical operations and core business lines . . . . 249

Firms are to devise their plans using the three economic
scenarios stipulated in the FRB’s stress test analysis: baseline,
adverse, and severely adverse. However, for the first round of living
wills, firms were asked only to devise a plan under the baseline
scenario, or “a reasonable substitute developed by the covered
company.” 250 Consistent with concerns about the TBTF phenomenon,
firms must devise resolution plans without relying on any government
funding. 251 To streamline submissions, regulators provided baseline
assumptions during the first wave of filings, which included: (1) no
reliance on government intervention; (2) an idiosyncratic scenario
$250 billion or more in total nonbank assets were to submit their living wills by July 1, 2012.
Institutions with between $100 billion and $250 billion in assets were required to submit their
living wills by July 1, 2013, and the remaining institutions were required to submit their plans
by December 31, 2013.
248. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(8).
249. See Resolution Plans (Regulation QQ), 12 C.F.R. pt. 243 (2014).
250. 12 C.F.R. § 243.4(a)(4)(i); see also Jeffrey M. Lacker, Speech at the Global Society of
Fellows Conference: Ending “Too Big to Fail” is Going to Be Hard Work (Apr. 9, 2013), available
at
http://www.richmondfed.org/press_room/speeches/president_jeff_lacker/2013/pdf/
lacker_speech_20130409.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ATN6-WQPT (“Because of the
magnitude of the planning efforts required, . . . firms were asked for analysis under just one
economic scenario . . . .”); Resolution Plans Required for Insured Depository Institutions with $50
Billion or More in Total Assets, 12 C.F.R. § 360.10 (2014):
The FDIC recognizes the burden that the Rule imposes on [covered insured depository
institutions (CIDIs)] and the challenge that CIDIs face in preparing their initial
Resolution Plans. To reduce this burden, the FDIC is requiring that feasibility for
initial Resolution Plans be assessed under only baseline economic condition scenarios.
Subsequent Resolution Plans must assess feasibility under adverse and severely
adverse economic condition scenarios as well.
251. Resolution Plan Required, 12 CFR § 243.3.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2402201

1 - Baradaran_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2014]

10/7/2014 12:15 PM

REGULATION BY HYPOTHETICAL

1303

specific to the banking institution that does not affect the global
markets generally; (3) the same hypothetical baseline assumptions
from the Federal Reserve’s stress tests.252
Critics have noted that the baseline assumptions provided by
the regulators, specifically that a crisis would affect only the firm and
no other market entities and that the government would not intervene,
present a situation that looks nothing like the recent financial crisis.
In the recent crisis, the reality was that “markets were not functioning
normally, funding markets were closed to virtually all market
participants, and the government came through with several hundred
billion dollars of support.” 253 However, in the initial round, the
agencies asked for “streamlined requirements . . . ; for example, firms
were asked for analysis under just one economic scenario, rather than
three.” 254 Because the living wills framework is still being developed,
the initial plans “are akin to test cases that will help shape future
standards and determine their effectiveness.” 255 The bottom line is
that these first drafts acted as little more than a “significant learning
exercise” for both regulators and firms.256
Compliance with the plans came with some regulatory “bite”:
In the event that the FRB and the FDIC decide that a SIFI’s plan is
“not credible or would not facilitate an orderly resolution of the
company,” the firm must resubmit a plan within a time frame to be
determined by the agencies. 257 If the firm fails to resubmit a plan
within the specified time, the agencies “may jointly impose more
stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity requirements, or restrictions on
the growth, activities, or operations of the company, or any subsidiary
thereof, until such time as the company resubmits a plan that remedies
the deficiencies.” 258 If the firm does not adhere to regulatory demands
to resolve deficiencies and resubmit a plan within two years, the
252. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, LIVING WILLS: KEY LESSONS FROM THE FIRST WAVE FOR
SECOND AND THIRD WAVE FILERS (July 11, 2012), available at http://www.davispolk.com/
files/Publication/cbadd86a-3680-4305-bf10-f3ea147b57c3/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
26191e6f-06dd-4d1b-ada8-f74a977be52e/ 071112_Living_Wills.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
AL25-J2X4.
253. Steve Schaefer, First Living Wills from JPMorgan, BofA, Goldman Don’t Tackle 2008Level Crisis, FORBES (July 3, 2012, 2:52 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2012/
07/03/first-living-wills-from-jpmorgan-bofa-goldman-dont-tackle-2008-level-crisis/, archived at
http: //perma.cc/YL9R-MT8C.
254. Lacker, supra note 250, at 4–5.
255. Joe Adler, Banks’ Living Wills Face First Critical Test, AM. BANKER (June 26, 2012, 2:35
PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_122/banks-living-wills-face-first-critical-test1050397-1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6TV3-Z7SW.
256. Id.
257. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(4)(B) (2012).
258. Id. § 5365(d)(5)(A).
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agencies may require the firm “to divest certain assets or operations”
that will facilitate an orderly resolution in case of failure.259
b. Implementation
On July 1, 2012, the first wave of banks filed their living wills.
The FRB and FDIC received plans from Deutsche Bank, UBS, Morgan
Stanley, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of New York Mellon, Bank of
America, Credit Suisse, State Street, Citigroup, Barclays, and
Goldman Sachs. The documents released to the public were summaries
of longer reports provided to regulators. 260 The banks drafted the living
wills according to the baseline assumptions provided by regulators.
Most of the plans included evidence of firm strength and hedging
activities, such as using derivatives to deal with interest rate risks.
Below are selected excerpts from bank resolution plans:
Deutsche Bank assumes that, following an idiosyncratic adverse
event affecting only the firm, the German supervisory authority,
BaFin, would produce a special purpose vehicle, or “bridge
bank,” and that U.S. regulators would cooperate with the
German regulators. The resolution plan also assumes that there
will be third-party purchasers such as “foreign financial
institutions, certain U.S. banks and non-bank financial
institutions,” that are able to acquire Deutsche Bank’s U.S.
businesses. 261
UBS’s plan states that, in a recovery or resolution scenario, it
would focus on the preservation of the potential value of any
saleable core business lines pending a potential sale. 262
However, UBS noted that “[g]iven the size of the UBS Group’s
operations, the range of potential purchasers is likely limited to
large financial institutions.” 263
Morgan Stanley assumes that, in the event of failure, “potential
purchasers could include a broad range of buyers including but
not limited to global, national and regional financial

259. Id. § 5365(d)(5)(B).
260. Resolution Plans, FED. RESERVE, (July 23, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
bankinforeg/resolution-plans.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/ X9G9-SCWY.
261. DEUTSCHE BANK, RESOLUTION PLAN (2013), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/
resplans/plans/deutschebank-165-1310.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3EEJ-5VYH.
262. UBS AG, 2013 RESOLUTION PLAN 30 (2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
bankinforeg/resolution-plans/ubs-1g-20131001.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/88W5-C3NS.
263. Id.
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institutions, private equity and hedge funds, and other financial
asset buyers such as insurance companies.”264
JPMorgan states, first, that it “has a fortress balance sheet and
significant liquidity and earning power.” 265 But that if it “were
to default on its obligations or be in danger of default, and
neither [its] recovery plan nor another private sector alternative
were available to prevent the default, the Firm could be resolved
under the provisions of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.” 266 In the
firm’s view, its failure would not pose systemic risk to the U.S.
financial system for a few reasons. One such reason is that the
firm provides for recapitalization and continuation of the firm’s
critical operations directly or through subsidiaries of a viable
bridge entity. Additionally, where necessary, the firm provides
for the divestiture or wind-down of the firm’s business with
minimum disruption. Details are sparse, and the plan adds that
JPMorgan “has provided the Federal Reserve with
comprehensive confidential supervisory information and
analyses” that are not included in the public portion of the
plan. 267
BNY Mellon describes its orderly resolution and concludes with
the assertion that “the Resolution Plan would result in no losses
to the FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund, to the United States
Department of Treasury or to depositors.”268
Bank of America’s resolution plan “contemplates a resolution
strategy in which Bank of America’s U.S. bank material entities
(‘MEs’), under a hypothetical failure scenario, would be resolved
by placing them into FDIC receiverships.” 269 Additionally, the
plan provides that Bank of America’s assets would be sold to
potential purchasers, such as private equity funds; hedge funds;
national, international, and regional financial institutions; and
other financial asset buyers.270

264. MORGAN STANLEY, RESOLUTION PLAN 22–23 (2013), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/
reform/resplans/plans/morgan-165-1310.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XE6M-BLJL.
MORGAN,
CHASE
&
CO.,
RESOLUTION
PLAN
28
(2013),
265. J.P.
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/jpmorgan-chase-1g-20131001.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/ NA5M-989Z.
266. Id. at 29.
267. Id.
268. BNY MELLON, RESOLUTION PLAN 24 (2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg
/resolution-plans/bk-ny-mellon-1g-20120702.pdf., archived at http://perma.cc/F92P-9EY6.
269. BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, RESOLUTION PLAN 39, http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/reform/resplans/plans/boa-1207.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ XWY8-4NP5.
270. Id.
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Credit Suisse’s plan contemplates its resolution under U.S.
operations or other applicable insolvency regimes. The plan
considers the sale of Credit Suisse’s core business lines and
potentially its franchise value, although the plan admits that
“this strategy may prove challenging in the event of an extended
period of stress.” 271 The range of potential purchasers may
include other broker dealers and banks as well as hedge funds. 272
State Street’s resolution plan “contemplates strategies involving
the failure of one or more State Street legal entities and include
recapitalization strategies and sale strategies for each of State
Street’s Core Business Lines, which State Street believes would
be attractive acquisition targets.” 273
Citigroup first states that, with its “increased financial strength
and liquidity, and its client-oriented business model, it is highly
unlikely that a resolution of the company would ever be
required.” 274 The basic features of Citi’s resolution plan are:
replacement of senior management and Board of Directors,
recapitalization of CBNA by Citigroup the Parent holding
company, wind-down, or sale. 275 It also states that “based on its
capital strength and asset quality . . . , Citi can be resolved
without taxpayer support.” 276
Barclays’s plan considers a “broad range of buyers for Barclays”
and that these potential buyers, such as national or
international financial institutions, would have “sufficient
capital.” Or “in the absence of a single purchaser, multiple
acquirers could purchase certain material entities through stock
acquisition and/or the purchase of certain assets which may
include assumption of associated liabilities.” 277

271. CREDIT SUISSE, CREDIT SUISSE GLOBAL RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION PLAN 14 (2013),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/credit-suisse-1g-20131001.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/3RRW-9L2Z.
272. Id.
273. STATE STREET CO. & STATE STREET BANK & TRUST CO., RESOLUTION PLAN 23 (2013),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/plans/statestreet-idi-7114.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/MQ4X-U6BX.
274. CITIGROUP INC. & CITIBANK, N.A., RESOLUTION PLAN 4 (2013), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/citigroup-1g-20131001.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/TFW7-KLAW.
275. Id. at 28–29.
276. Id. at 29.
277. BARCLAYS, RESOLUTION PLAN 13–14 (2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
bankinforeg/resolution-plans/barclays-plc-1g-20120702.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X6V79MME.
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Goldman Sachs’s resolution plan was the most thorough and
self-reflective of the plans. The firm admits that “circumstances
leading to the failure of a systemically important financial
institution will likely be different than the specific assumptions
[provided by the FDIC], and we expect that future submissions
of our Resolution Plan will include other conditions and may
have different assumptions.” 278 The firm recognizes the
integrated nature of international financial markets but
believes that selling the assets of its material entities to one or
multiple buyers postproceeding would avoid a firm-wide asset
liquidation and is therefore likely to have a less disorderly
impact on the market. 279 “Any sale would need to be conducted
quickly with the benefit of expedited and coordinated regulatory
approvals to maintain the franchise value of the Firm.” 280
Goldman Sachs also states that “potential purchasers for the
businesses or assets of our Material Entities and for other nonResolution Business Core Lines of Goldman Sachs could include
global financial institutions, private equity funds, insurance
companies or sovereign wealth funds.”281
c. Analysis of Living Will Regime
Although the living will requirement of Dodd-Frank is aimed at
assisting in resolving the difficulties presented by large firms during
the next financial crisis, most industry observers and regulators agree
that living wills are unlikely to serve that purpose. 282 Rather, living
wills appear to be a hypothetical ex ante exercise that serve an
informational, as opposed to an operational, function. 283 These plans

278. THE GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., SUMMARY OF RESOLUTION PLAN 314 (2012),
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/plans/goldman-165-1207.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/ 4UXB-Z29L.
279. Id. at 32.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Brad Miller, Regulators, Demand Credible Living Wills Now—Not ‘Ultimately,’ AM.
BANKER (Dec. 26, 2012, 12:00 PM) (“Simon Johnson, former chief economist for the International
Monetary Fund, concluded . . . that the living wills process was ‘a sham, meaningless boilerplate
and box checking.’ ”), http://www.americanbanker.com/ bankthink/regulators-must-demandcredible-living-wills-now-not-ultimately-1055434-1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/FL8JWFAQ; Simon Johnson, The Myth of a Perfect Orderly Liquidation Authority for Big Banks,
ECONOMIX (May 16, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/the-myth-ofa-perfect-orderly-liquidation-authority-for-big-banks/, archived at http://perma.cc/UUG4-DCGG.
283. In advising firms on the development of living wills, the Pew Research Center suggests
the regular use of hypotheticals in developing resolution plans or living wills. PEW FINANCIAL
REFORM PROJECT, STANDARDS FOR RAPID RESOLUTION PLANS
(2011),
http://
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are not legally binding, and very few people believe that they will
actually be used to break up big banks. 284 Former Congressman
Barney Frank, one of the sponsors of the bill, even admitted that living
wills are “probably not of use in a crisis, but they’re a useful pre-crisis
tool.” 285 Goldman Sachs states in its living will that a real crisis will
likely not resemble the assumptions in their plan. Apparently,
Goldman Sachs also “think[s] the whole assignment is busywork, and
[is] not shy about saying so.” 286
Many of the plans state that using hypothetical scenarios is
helpful for planning purposes. 287 Given these stated purposes, living
wills start to resemble stress tests in their methodology and
underlying objectives. Officials are thus relying on living wills to
provide information that would eventually result in targeted or
“smart” regulation, such as requiring more capital, restructuring
firms, or even breaking up the firms. 288 In essence, living wills would
be used as a fire drill to expose weaknesses in firms that could be
remedied ex ante. So far, however, regulators have not assessed these

fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/policy%20page/Standards%20for%20Rapid%20Resolution%20Plans.p
df, archived at http://perma.cc/RWZ6-TNND.
284. Lawrence Baxter, a professor of law at Duke University, said:
I think the heart of the problem is scale and interconnectedness. . . . I don't believe
there are many people who think living wills and the orderly liquidation process are
really going to work if one of those banks fails. . . . We manage that all the time with
smaller banks . . . but once you get over the $100 billion range and into the $1 trillion
range, it ceases to have any credibility.
Victoria Finkle, Seven Reasons the Debate over ‘Too Big to Fail’ Is Here to Stay, AM. BANKER, Apr.
2, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 7937747. Jaret Seiberg, a senior policy analyst at Guggenheim
Securities’s Washington Research Group, stated, “At the end of the day, this isn’t going to become
the hidden tool to break up JPMorgan and Bank of America. . . . To take that radical of a step,
you’re going to need something more concrete than disputes over how credible a living will was
written.” Jesse Hamilton, Big Banks Create Living Wills to Tell U.S. Regulators How to
POST
(June
28,
2012),
http://
Dismember
Their
Corpses,
FIN.
business.financialpost.com/2012/06/28/big-banks-create-living-wills-to-tell-u-s-regulators-howto-dismember-their-corpses/, archived at http://perma.cc/TKW7-CX6V; Sloan, supra note 239;
The Dodd-Frank Act: Too Big Not to Fail, supra note 239.
285. Sloan, supra note 239.
286. Matt Levine, Banks Prove That They are Not Too Big to Fail By Saying “We Can Fail”
on a Piece of Paper, Moving on, DEALBREAKER (July 5, 2012), http://dealbreaker.com/
2012/07/banks-prove-that-they-are-not-too-big-to-fail-by-saying-we-can-fail-on-a-piece-of-papermoving-on/, archived at http://perma.cc/ET2T-KCT6.
287. In its resolution plan, Barclays stated that “[u]sing a hypothetical resolution scenario,
resolution plans spotlight areas where cooperation among regulatory authorities across
jurisdictions is required in order to facilitate actual resolution of global financial institutions.”
BARCLAYS, supra note 277, at 2.
288. Jeffrey M. Lacker, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Speech at the University
of Richmond: Ending ‘Too Big to Fail’ Is Going to Be Hard Work (Apr. 9, 2013), available at
http://www.richmondfed.org/press_room/speeches/president_jeff_lacker/2013/pdf/lacker_speech_
20130409.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X6N3-LTVH.
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plans beyond a cursory review; in particular, living wills have not led
to structural changes or capital infusions. 289 But in theory, annual
updates of living wills “will ensure that when a living will is needed, it
accurately reflects a bank’s internal operations and risk profile.” 290
And requiring firms to review and draft living wills on a regular basis
could at least “raise the bar on the quality of their risk information and
management information systems, their risk and scenario analyses
and their contingency planning, all of which may have benefits even in
the absence of a crisis.” 291
In its resolution plan, Barclays noted that “[r]esolution plans
can enable financial institutions, working in close conjunction with
their regulators to assess their operations on a holistic level to
determine whether there are appropriate operational changes that can
be made to make institutions more resolvable in the event of
failure.” 292 According to Barclays, the living will should help by forcing
them “to take mitigation actions to avoid failure and to reduce the
contagion impact of an institution’s failure on the rest of the financial
system” and by “putting processes in place to identify risk
concentrations in advance, by developing capital or liquidity
contingency plans that help stave off insolvency or illiquidity in the
event of adverse market conditions.” 293
Thus, living wills, like stress tests, are an extension of the risk
management regime into a hypothetical regime. Regulators will test
internal risk management mechanisms through hypothetical future
scenarios. They will then use the results of these tests, assuming they
are performed rigorously, to design targeted, entity-specific regulation
aimed at curing particular weaknesses highlighted by the tests.

289. Barbara A. Rehm, Regulators’ Reputation Sinks Along with Industry’s, AM. BANKER
(Mar. 28, 2013, 12:57 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_60/regulatorsreputation-sinks-along-with-industry-s-1057876-1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/K8U3ZSLK.
290. John F. Bovenzi, Another View: Why Banks Need ‘Living Wills,’ DEALBOOK (July 8, 2010,
12:30
PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/another-view-why-banks-need-livingwills/?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/3T5N-YJYF; see also Olivia Schmid, Living Wills: Will
They Fail to Remedy ‘Too Big to Fail’?, 18 COLUM. J. EUR. L. ONLINE 6, 9 (2012) (“[These
streamlined institutions will] be easier for regulators to oversee and will help regulators identify,
early enough, areas where a SIFI’s business strategies fall short of best practices.”).
291. DAVIS, POLK & WARDWELL LLP & MCKINSEY & CO., CREDIBLE LIVING WILLS: THE FIRST
GENERATION 2 (Apr. 25, 2011), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/
37a3a804-6a6c-4e10-a628-7a1dbbaece7c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c621815c-9413436b-91ea-3451b2b4cf32/042611_DavisPolkMcKinsey_LivingWills_Whitepaper.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/743E-J2ZL.
292. BARCLAY’S, supra note 277, at 2.
293. Id.
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3. Weaknesses of Living Wills
After the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, regulators
required five of the largest oil companies to submit plans to deal with
future hypothetical oil spills. 294 The plans resembled living wills in
many important ways. The firms were instructed to plan, in as much
detail as possible, for a potential future disaster such as an oil spill. 295
As with living wills, many observers derided the oil companies’ plans
as not credible. The House Energy and Commerce Committee
Chairman, Henry Waxman, said that the “cookie-cutter” nature of the
submissions revealed that “none of the five oil companies has an
adequate response plan” for a serious oil spill. 296 “When you look at the
details, it becomes evident these plans are just paper exercises,” he
added. 297 At a hearing of the House Energy and Environment
Subcommittee, Congressman Bart Stupak said, “Exxon and the other
oil companies are just as unprepared to respond to a major oil spill in
the gulf as BP.” 298
In the five-hundred-page plans, the firms tried to assure
regulators “that they could handle oil spills much larger than the one
now threatening [the Gulf of Mexico’s] environment and economy.” 299
However, the plans were lacking in important details and were wrong
in obvious areas. For example, four of the plans included protections of
walruses, sea lions, and seals, none of which are to be found in the Gulf
of Mexico. 300 In addition, Shell Oil Company noted that, in Alaska, “a
larger crude oil spill would be unlikely because the water is shallow,”
which was an untested and disputed assumption. 301 Further, Shell
claimed that if there were an oil spill, Alaska Clean Seas in Prudhoe
Bay would be able to respond to any spill. 302 However, “[t]he company
is 250 to 350 miles away” from the area where Shell plans to drill, and
“[i]n the event of a spill . . . , Alaska Clean Seas would be able to provide

294. Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Lawmakers Attack Plans Oil Companies Had in Place
to Deal with a Spill, WASH. POST (June 16, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/06/15/AR2010061501700.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Q5Q5T9QG.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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only a fraction of the resources BP called upon within the first 24 hours
after the Deepwater Horizon explosion.” 303
A major problem with these disaster plans was that they were
all written by “the same tiny Texas subcontractor,” a Houston-based
firm with thirty-five employees. 304 This firm “used common
assumptions for different exploration wells.” 305 Living wills for banks
share this problem because they also are all drafted by the same law
firm. 306 Although this law firm is the most sophisticated shop in
dealing with Dodd-Frank issues, 307 it is still only one firm. Failure to
subject living wills to a broader marketplace of ideas limits their
utility.
a. Not Credible—Unrealistic
Contingency plans cannot be accurately tailored now to fit
future crises for a number of reasons. First, it is difficult for firms to
predict the extent of a crisis, particularly for large, multinational
institutions that are subject to a multitude of domestic regulatory
structures. Second, it is also hard for firms to anticipate “which parts
of the firm will be under the greatest stress, what geographical regions
may be affected most severely, and what the condition in various
markets and economies will be, as well as the stability of
counterparties and similarly situated institutions.” 308 It is impossible
to predict the financial landscape in a hypothetical future world.
Third, firms will also be incapable of predicting the exact value
of their subdivisions, subsidiaries, and assets in the event of market
decline. They may also be unable to accurately identify potential
buyers. In their resolution plans, most of the large banks, including
Goldman Sachs, stated that they would be able to find numerous
potential buyers for their assets, including “global financial
institutions, private equity funds, insurance companies, or sovereign

303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.; Matthew Huisman, Q&A: Davis Polk & Wardwell’s Annette Nazareth, LEGALTIMES
(May 30, 2013), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/05/qa-davis-polk-wardwells-annettenazareth.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3T4N-4T7Z.
307. Julie Triedman, For Davis Polk, Dodd-Frank Pays, AM. LAW. (Dec. 2010), http://
www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/Articles//For.Davis.Polk.Dodd-Frank.Pays.AmLaw.dec10.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/8JUW-46BD.
308. Governor Daniel K. Tarullo, Speech at the Symposium on Building the Financial System
of the 21st Century: Toward an Effective Resolution Regime for Larger Financial Institutions
(Mar.
18,
2010),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
tarullo20100318a.htm, archived at http:// perma.cc/ U99P-YZBK.
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wealth funds.” 309 However, Jim Millstein, the Treasury Department’s
former chief restructuring officer, noted that “[t]here are few, if any,
institutions with the balance sheet to support the purchase of one of
these businesses in good times. . . . In a crisis . . . no one will be able to
do it unless the FDIC supports the purchase with debt and equity
financing,” a result he considers unlikely. 310 “Therefore,” he said,
“there is no credible way to break [these firms] up and sell them during
a crisis.” 311 In the event of a real crisis, many experts state that there
will not be buyers available to absorb these assets 312—that is, buyers
other than the Federal Government. “When an institution fails, it
usually happens suddenly and in an unpredictable way, and someone
has to write a check.”313
Lastly, SIFIs also do not have incentives to draw up credible
plans. This is an area where firm management and regulators have
opposing goals. Managers of these institutions “can be expected to seek
to preserve as much value for shareholders as possible in its
planning.” 314 However, the “supervisors’ objective in a crisis is to
achieve an orderly resolution, which will often entail winding down or
restructuring the insolvent firm in ways that effectively wipe out
shareholder interests.” 315
b. Regulatory Discretion
Because living wills are not binding on firms or regulators,
regulators exercise discretion in deciding whether to take living wills
into account at all in wielding their supervisory powers. 316 Although
regulators have the authority to downsize and break up banks, they

309. GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 278, at 32.
310. Sloan, supra note 239.
311. Id.
312. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 468 (2011).
313. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Nelson D. Schwartz, “Living Wills” for Too-Big-To-Fail
Banks Are Released, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/business/
living-wills-of-how-to-unwind-big-banks-are-released.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ WNB2V4DD.
314. Governor Daniel K. Tarullo, Speech at the Institute of International Bankers
Conference on Cross-Border Insolvency Issues: Supervising and Resolving Large Financial
Institutions (Nov. 10, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
tarullo20091110a.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/XCU6-4BF9.
315. Id.
316. Levitin, supra note 312, at 468. Former FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair noted that although
“she think[s] [regulators] should use the authority [given to them in Dodd-Frank], . . . how they
use it is going to be up to them.” Hamilton, supra note 284.
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may not “have the guts to actually follow the will (and pronounce the
death sentence that must precede it).” 317
Prior to filing the living wills, experts predicted that the initial
wave would trigger a dialogue between the agencies and firms
regarding the viability of the plans. 318 However, by March 2013,
observers noted that regulators had provided little feedback regarding
the banks’ plans. 319 William Dudley, the president of the Federal
Reserve Bank in New York, admitted that “this initial exercise has
confirmed that we are a long way from the desired situation in which
large, complex firms could be allowed to go bankrupt without major
disruptions to the financial system and large costs to society.” 320 He
added that “significant changes” would have to be made and that “we
have only taken the first step in a long journey.” 321
In April 2013, the FRB and the FDIC granted a three-month
extension to institutions that filed their living wills in 2012 so those
institutions could devise another round of living wills. 322 The agencies
issued further instructions on what type of information should be
included in living wills. Among other requirements, the agencies
identified a set of obstacles that a firm may encounter during
resolution. 323 In their second set of plans, firms had to address how
they will deal with multiple competing insolvencies in different
jurisdictions, the problem of potential ring-fencing by foreign host
authorities, the risk that third-party services might be interrupted,
and the risk of insufficient liquidity. 324

317. David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 129 (2010).
318. Adler, supra note 255.
319. Jesse Hamilton, FDIC Promises Big U.S. Banks a Helping Hand on Next Living Wills,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-05/fdic-promises-big-u-sbanks-a-helping-hand-on-next-living-wills.html, archived at http://perma.cc/MF8D-397M (noting
that banks “are not totally clear how they did in the opening round” (internal quotations
omitted)).
320. President and CEO William C. Dudley, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the
Clearing House’s Second Annual Business Meeting and Conference: Solving the Too Big To Fail
Problem (Nov. 15, 2012), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2012/
dud121115.html, archived at http:// perma.cc/YV8-ZQF8.
321. Id.
322. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Agencies Provide Additional Instructions for
Submission of Some Resolution Plans (Apr. 15, 2013), available at http://fdic.gov/news/news/
press/2013/pr13027.html?source=govdelivery, archived at http:// perma.cc/ 6MSC-MYMF.
323. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. & BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., GUIDANCE
FOR 2013 § 165(d) ANNUAL RESOLUTION PLAN SUBMISSIONS BY DOMESTIC COVERED COMPANIES
THAT SUBMITTED INITIAL RESOLUTION PLANS IN 2012 5, available at http://fdic.gov/
regulations/reform/domesticguidance.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NJ28-Y9LF.
324. Id. at 5–6.
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The second round of plans were also not scrutinized by
regulators and therefore will likely be of little use. 325 The FDIC would
like to dispel that illusion and give these plans some legitimacy.
Martin Gruenberg, the Chairman of the FDIC, stated that the eleven
banks in the first wave of filing “won’t have the safety net they had
last year when they were told their plans wouldn’t be rejected if they
weren’t credible.” 326 James Wigand, the head of the FDIC’s Office of
Complex Financial Institutions, echoed this sentiment, stating that
the FDIC is prepared to consider exercising its authority to correct
deficiencies in living wills. 327 Wigand added that 2013 resolution plans
“will be subject to informational completeness reviews and reviews for
resolvability under the Bankruptcy Code” and to certain benchmarks
for assessing a resolution. 328
In August 2014, the FDIC and the FRB engaged the living wills
for the first time by sending letters to 11 banks stating that their living
will plans were “not credible.” The vice president of the FDIC, Thomas
M. Hoenig said in a statement that “despite the thousands of pages of
material these firms submitted, the plans provide no credible or clear
path toward bankruptcy that doesn’t require unrealistic assumptions
and direct or indirect public support.” Regulators have still not taken
any action on the living wills. 329
Although regulators continue to emphasize that small steps are
being taken towards forming a credible living wills framework,
detractors have noted that “[t]he uncertainties in the financial system
may not allow for year after year of polite suggestions by regulators
and modest tweaks by institutions.” 330 In the meantime, living wills
impose high regulatory costs on SIFIs. Regulators estimate that a
“credible” resolution plan may take up to 12,400 hours to complete, but
a more complex institution may require much more preparation. 331

325. Hamilton, supra note 319.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Improving Cross Border Resolution To Better Protect Taxpayers and the Economy:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Int’l Trade and Fin., U.S. Senate, 113th Cong.
(2013) (statement of James R. Wigand, Director, Office of Complex Financial Institutions),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spmay1513_2.html#_ftnref3, archived at
http://perma.cc/QKK6-KDAR.
329. Peter Eavis, Federal Reserve and F.D.I.C. Fault Big Banks’ “Living Wills,” DEALBOOK
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/federal-reserve-and-f-d-i-c-fault-bigbanks-living-wills/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0, archived at http:// perma.cc/WJD3-Z5PV.
330. Miller, supra note 282.
331. Marcia L. Goldstein et al., Navigating Dodd-Frank’s Resolution Plan Requirement, N.Y.
L.J., Dec. 5, 2011, at S4.
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Furthermore, living wills must be updated within forty-five days of an
event that may have a material effect on a firm’s business strategy. 332
c. Market Messages: Potemkin’s Village
Early criticisms of living wills predicted that the regime would
have a damaging effect on firms’ market ratings. Moody’s predicted
that living wills “could potentially result in rating downgrades where
ratings currently incorporate a high degree of government support.” 333
These downgrades would in turn increase the firms’ cost of funding. 334
However, once it became apparent that these living wills would not be
scrutinized, the criticisms came to echo those of stress tests, with living
wills derided as “simply an exercise to make people feel better.” 335
Barclays admits that “market awareness of the existence of living wills
and the possibility of a resolution may increase confidence in
systemically important financial institutions, in particular as a result
of greater collaboration among supervisors.” 336
Critics also assert that living wills are simply “false hope”
because “they were not prepared by the executives who would respond
in the event of another financial crisis.”337 Instead, they are merely
exercises done by lawyers and firm representatives in the context of a
stable banking world. 338 This is apparent in the living wills
themselves. All of the plans begin by touting the strength of the firm
with an overwhelmingly positive outlook. The plans show that the
firms exceed capital requirements and have more than adequate
funding available to them. Citigroup even noted that it “believes it is
currently in compliance with the proposed Basel III [Liquidity
Coverage Ratio], even though this requirement is not proposed to take
effect until 2015” and states that it is unlikely that the firm will ever
be in need of resolution. 339 Much like Potemkin’s farcical villages built

332. 12 C.F.R. § 381.3(b)(2) (2014) (requiring resolution plans).
333. Jane Croft & Patrick Jenkins, Moody's Warns Over 'Living Wills', FIN. TIMES (Sept. 23,
2009,
10:38
PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/504a117a-a874-11de-924200144feabdc0.html#axzz2VCfnEXfe.
334. Id.
335. Silver-Greenberg & Schwartz, supra note 313.
336. See also Resolution Plans, supra note 260 (providing an overview of resolution plans);
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., OFFICE OF COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS DODD-FRANK ACT TITLE
I: LIVING WILLS OVERVIEW (2012), available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/srac/2012/2012-0125_living-wills.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CGQ6-ADBV (providing an overview of living
wills and the regulatory process).
337. Silver-Greenberg & Schwartz, supra note 313.
338. Hamilton, supra note 284.
339. CITIGROUP INC. & CITIBANK, N.A., supra note 274.
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to impress outsiders, 340 living wills falsely portray the large banks that
produce them as stable structures that could fail without causing
major systemic disarray.
Therefore, like the stress tests, living wills are used as positive
market indicators to shore up confidence in the banking system.
Instilling confidence in banking should not be overlooked as a
regulatory aim. After all, governments support banks through deposit
insurance and bail them out during crises because a banking system
cannot survive without trust. When trust is gone, banks encounter
runs and consequently fail. Therefore, regulators have crosscutting
incentives: to assure safety and soundness in banking and to portray
safety and soundness in banking. Because firms are still reeling from
a crisis, and trust in the system is low, these two aims are likely to
conflict and produce unholy results. Regulators, though they would
like to rehabilitate the firms as soon as possible, are perhaps even more
anxious than banks to shore up the public’s confidence, in large part
because the latter tends to produce the former.
d. Corporations Are People
Like Greek tragedies, crises in financial firms are often stories
of individual hubris. For example, Lehman Brothers’ failure was at
least as much about CEO Richard Fuld’s mismanagement of the firm
as about the failure of the subprime market. 341 Similarly, Bear Stearns
suffered at the hands of a disengaged CEO, Jim Cayne.342 Bank of
America’s ill-advised purchase of Merrill Lynch has been explained as
a Southern outsider’s (Ken Lewis’s) desire to “play with the big boys
on Wall Street.” 343 Michael Lewis described AIG Financial Products’
irresponsible and market-creating purchases of collateralized debt
obligations from Wall Street as an arrogant, uninformed wager by AIG
officer Joseph Cassano. Cassano has since been labeled “The Man Who

340. Amy Tikkanen, Grigory Aleksandrovich Potemkin, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE
(Apr. 15, 2014) http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/472610/Grigory-AleksandrovichPotemkin, archived at http://perma.cc/Z84J-TDGQ.
341. Robert Lenzer, Wall Street Big Fish Stink from the Head Down, FORBES (Apr. 23, 2010,
5:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/23/richard-fuld-jimmy-cayne-barack-obama-streettalkmarkets-lenzner.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3ZZF-BYD5.
342. Roddy Boyd, Bear Stearns CEO Steps Down, CNN MONEY (Jan. 9, 2008, 10:16 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/01/08/news/companies/stearns_cayne.fortune/index.htm?postversion
=2008010819, archived at http://perma.cc/3945-DDFF.
343. Frontline: Breaking the Banks (PBS television broadcast June 30, 2009), available at
http://video.pbs.org/video/1168339502/.
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Crashed the World.” 344 Going back to previous disasters, Enron failed
because of the dishonesty and conceit of “The Smartest Guys in the
Room”—Enron CEOs Kenneth Lay and Jeffery Skilling. 345
All this to say that financial crises are not just about failures of
balance sheets in the face of severely adverse market scenarios, but
about men and women (but mostly men) who unwittingly build houses
upon sand. And there will always be tales of mismanagement and
miscalculation so long as humans are involved in the markets. How
can regulators take account of the risks and problems that involve
individual decisionmakers? This question is central to the entire
regulatory regime and too complex and multifaceted to answer in these
pages. However, it is clear that the stress tests and the living wills—
indeed, the entire risk management complex—appear to be leaving
human decisionmaking out of their models, perhaps because there is
no adequate way to design models to account for human choice. To be
sure, the models are meant to reflect and inform human choice, but the
hypothetical regime, so focused on future scenarios, cannot take into
account how managers of balance sheets will respond to diverse
scenarios.
For example, if the stock market suddenly rises or falls, will a
fund manager sell, buy, short, or hedge in a particular market? And
will she use the opportunity to double down on risk, hoping for a big
reward? Or will she accept modest losses in order to prevent what
might be a greater loss to come? Stress tests and living wills are not
designed to answer these questions—nor do they pretend to. The FRB
stated that the models “do not make explicit behavioral assumptions
about the possible actions of a BHC’s creditors and
counterparties . . . .” 346
344. Armen Keteyian, AIG’s Joseph Cassano Refuses to Play Fall Guy, CBS NEWS (June 30,
2010, 8:09 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/aigs-joseph-cassano-refuses-to-play-fall-guy/,
archived at http://perma.cc/83H3-XVP6.
345. A. O. Scott, Those You Love to Hate: A Look at the Mighty Laid Low, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
22, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/22/movies/22enro.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
E3JV-CZYH (reviewing Alex Gibney’s documentary ENRON: THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE
ROOM(Magnolia Pictures 2005)).
346. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL ASSESSMENT
PROGRAM: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION (2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
bankinforeg/bcreg20090424a1.pdf; archived at http://perma.cc/ 4UQD-VBFP. Cass Sunstein
highlights the phenomenon of behavioral biases in a theory called bounded rationality, which
describes cognitive biases that overvalue some risks, undervalue others, and lead to irrational
decision making. Cass Sunstein et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1471 (1998). These limits have been used to explain shortcomings in regulation in a
variety of contexts, including workplace discrimination and personal decision making. Id.; see
also Amanda Leiter, The Perils of a Half-Built Bridge: Risk Perception, Shifting Majorities, and
the Nuclear Power Debate, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 31 (2008) (analyzing the modern debate over nuclear
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There are two ways to deal with these shortcomings: (1)
recognize them and abandon the hypothetical regime based on the
conclusion that unreliable data and indicators are worse than none at
all, or (2) attempt to remedy them by accounting for human behavior
in the hypothetical scenarios. Above, I made the case that regulation
by hypothetical in its current form is a flawed framework that should
be abandoned. Others have also discredited the risk management
regime, of which stress testing and living wills are an outgrowth. 347
The banking sector is riddled with unmanageable risks that cannot be
adequately controlled. The hypothetical regime therefore offers false
confidence.
Stepping away from the risk management regime would lead to
some clear remedies that are politically charged and difficult to
enforce. For example, many agree that breaking up the largest banks
would limit the banks’ power and the effects of their failure and end
TBTF. 348 Enforcing a large capital or equity buffer would also reduce
systemic risk by changing incentives and allowing absorption of more
risk for longer periods of time, allowing firms to withstand crises. In
addition, enforcing activity restrictions that separate traditional
banking from more risky ventures could contain risks to fewer
products and institutions and reduce contagion. These proposals
should be seriously considered by policymakers, but they are outside
the scope of this article.
However, if regulators are to press forward with regulation by
hypothetical, the hypothetical needs to account for human behavior.
The following Part suggests that financial war games are an important
way to increase the utility of hypothetical regulation. 349

power in light of public cognitive biases). Experts in this field have not yet had much to say about
financial decision making because it has been opaque and not subject to review.
347. See Haldane, supra note 5.
348. See, e.g., Simon Johnson, Break up the Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2014, 7:00 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/01/12/are-big-banks-out-of-control/break-up-thebig-banks, archived at http://perma.cc/ALK7-A2RY.
349. Other articles have referred to financial war games in passing, but without any detail
besides mentioning it as a possibility. See e.g., Weber, supra note 17, at 2263–66; Marco Sorge,
Stress-testing Financial Systems: An Overview of Current Methodologies 18–20 (Bank for Int’l
Settlements, Working Paper No. 165, 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work165.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/KZM6-ZARL (“Some papers have modeled endogenous trading
decisions . . . . Further research should attempt to lengthen the time horizon and to extend the
analysis from trading strategies to lending strategies, thus integrating the assessment of
feedback effects for both market and credit risks.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2402201

1 - Baradaran_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2014]

10/7/2014 12:15 PM

REGULATION BY HYPOTHETICAL

1319

IV. FINANCIAL WAR GAMES
The military has used war games for many years, both as a test
of the military’s responsiveness to crises and as a way to devise
military strategies. 350 If we are to test firms against hypothetical
scenarios, it is crucial that regulators gauge not only the ability of
balance sheets to withstand distress but also the likely behavior of
managers and others when faced with unanticipated stresses.
Properly conducted financial war games would test firm
management and balance sheets as well as regulatory response in the
context of crisis management. Note the inclusion of both market
participants and regulators. Because the reaction to a financial crisis
is inherently a regulatory affair, a hypothesis tested against only the
market participants—as is currently the case under regulation by
hypothetical—tells only a partial story. This Part introduces the
concept of financial war games, drawing parallels to simulated crisis
management used elsewhere in government. It then discusses features
of financial war games that would be peculiar to banking and financial
regulation, including issues such as game design and administration,
as well as limitations on the information gained from the exercises.
A. The Theory of War Games
The concept of war games—or war simulations, as the military
refers to the exercise—has been practiced for centuries. Indeed,
historians claim that the Persians invented the game of chess as an
early war simulation. 351 Currently, war simulations involve tools that
range from pure computer modeling to fully staged military ground
exercises. Since the 1950s, the U.S. Department of Defense has created
and used a variety of simulations, 352 including computerized war

350. Nicholas Schmidle, Getting bin Laden, NEW YORKER (Aug. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/08/08/ 110808fa_fact_schmidle, archived at http://
perma.cc/6949-7U8E (last visited Aug. 11, 2014); FAQ’s, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/War-Gaming/Documents/About-Us/FAQ-s.aspx,
archived at http://perma.cc/DQ8X-RD7K.
351. History of Chess, TRADEGAMES.ORG, http://www.tradgames.org.uk/games/Chess.htm,
archived at http://perma.cc/RXL9-6FJH (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
352. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, a war game is “a simulation, by whatever
means, of a military operation involving two or more opposing forces, using rules, data, and
procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation.” DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT
PUBLICATION 1-02: DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS (2014), available at FAQ’s,
supra note 350.
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games as well as “networked, multiplayer simulations.” 353 Today,
military simulations include “immersive virtual-reality training
environments, and complex tactical team trainers comprising multiple
sites each replicating the physical environment of one or more military
platforms.” 354
In The Art of Wargaming, Peter Perla defined a war game as:
a warfare model or simulation whose operation does not involve the activities of actual
military forces, and whose sequence of events affects and is, in turn, affected by the
decisions made by players representing the opposing sides. In the end, a wargame is an
exercise in human interaction, and the simulated outcomes of those decisions make it
impossible for two games to be the same. . . . Its forte is the exploration of the role and
potential effects of human decisions. 355

Experts state that effective military war games must be made up of
several elements. First, war games must simulate the “conflictual
nature of war.” 356 In other words, a war game forces an institution to
face an opponent with plans contrary to its own. This exposes
uncertainties and risks in the institution’s assumptions. 357 Second,
war games must recognize that chance plays a prominent role in many
decisions and outcomes. For example, the Union Army under George
McClellan lost track of Robert E. Lee’s Confederate forces and would
not have found them but for the “accidental discovery of a copy of Lee’s
plans, which were found in a cigar box” by troops foraging in a deserted
Confederate camp. 358 Thus, human luck changed the outcome of a
critical campaign and perhaps the war.359 But war games can
aggregate the thousands of decisions by individuals at every stage in
an action to accurately depict the way myriads of mundane decisions
can have significance over time. 360 By taking chance events and
uncertainties seriously, “military users of war games have been using
chance or Monte Carlo gaming techniques to determine combat results

353. Carrie McLeroy, History of Military Gaming, SOLDIERS MAG., Sept. 2008, at 4; available
at http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/rv5_other/soldiers/archives/pdfs/sep08all.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/X9B3-DB2V.
354. Jason E. Summers, Simulation-Based Military Training: An Engineering Approach To
Better Addressing Competing Environmental, Fiscal, and Security Concerns, J. WASH. ACAD. SCI.,
Spring 2012, at 9, 12, available at http://www.washacadsci.org/Journal/ Journalarticles/V.98-1simulation_based_military_training_jSummers.pdf, archived at http:// perma.cc/XG73-2W92.
355. PETER PERLA, THE ART OF WARGAMING 164 (1990).
356. Stephen P. Glick & L. Ian Charters, War, Games, and Military History, 18 J. CONTEMP.
HIST. 567, 573–74 (1983).
357. Id. at 573.
358. Id. at 574.
359. Id.
360. Id.
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for nearly as long as they have been employing war games.” 361 The
third critical element of an effective war game is to replicate the “fog
of war,” a condition that results from high levels of chance and
uncertainty in military combat.362
Of course, the more involved and complex the simulation, the
higher the cost and the higher the informational value. For example,
before the Navy SEALs operation that captured Osama bin Laden in
Pakistan, the SEALs practiced the maneuver many times in the
United States. 363 The military did its best to replicate the Pakistani
compound housing bin Laden, casting various players in realistic
simulations to determine, ex ante, potential problems the SEALs
would face during the actual attack. 364 The war gaming proved useful
training for the troops. However, there was one major hitch in the
operation: one helicopter was grounded because of a centripetal air
suction. This grounding occurred because, when reconstructing the
compound in the U.S., the military surrounded it with a chain link
fence. In reality, the compound was surrounded by walls. This
discrepancy created different landing conditions in practice than the
helicopters faced in reality. Had the military created an exact replica,
that problem could have been avoided.
The key point is this: the closer one comes to simulating an
actual scenario, the less likely it is that unanticipated situations will
derail a plan of action. However, it is very costly to simulate all possible
contingencies. Real war simulations, then, are used for the most highstakes operations. While financial war games would not require the
amount of expensive weaponry and human power that true war
gaming requires, creating realistic financial simulations is more costly
than merely running computer models. Even so, given the dangers that
failed financial institutions would pose to the world economy,
conducting some high-stakes simulations may well be worth the cost.
B. Financial War Games
Conducting financial war games is not without precedent. In
March of 2009, the Pentagon hosted a two-day financial war game
event at the Warfare Analysis Laboratory in Laurel, Maryland, a

361. Glick and Charters define Monte Carlo as “the determination of outcomes on a random
basis through such means as dice, roulette wheels, etc.” Id. at 569, 581.
362. Id. at 576.
363. Schmidle, supra note 350.
364. See id.
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facility that is used for conducting military war games. 365 However,
these war games focused on national security, not on financial
stability. 366 The military was concerned about global financial
problems because of their “real world consequences, including failed
states.” 367 Bankers and hedge fund managers, among others, were
invited to the Pentagon to role-play a financial disaster. 368 Paul
Bracken, a professor at the Yale School of Management and expert in
private equity, attended the sessions. He stated that the exercise “was
an example of the changing nature of conflict . . . . The purpose of the
game is not really to predict the future, but to discover the issues you
need to be thinking about.”369
Although financial regulators have not yet conducted any war
game scenarios, Deloitte, a private consulting firm, has offered to
conduct war game scenarios for its financial institution clients. 370 In
2010, Deloitte acquired Simulstrat, a spinoff from the Department of
War Studies at King’s College London and a pioneer in war gaming for
public and private sector organizations. 371 Deloitte suggests that its
clients use war games to strengthen and expose the flaws in their
internal stress testing and their Dodd-Frank mandated living wills. 372
However, the object of these war games is not to control for risks or
even test balance sheets. They are primarily used to inform firm
structure or to create protocols for their crisis-management
employees. 373
Conducting war games would certainly benefit individual firms
as the exercise allows firms to assess the scope of vulnerabilities, the
strength of their contingency plans, and their general risk profiles.
However, to measure systemic risk, regulators need more than just
firm-specific information. Regulators need to measure risks across
365. Eamon Javers, Pentagon Preps for Economic Warfare, POLITICO (Apr. 9, 2009, 4:18 AM),
available at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0409/21053.html, archived at http:// perma.cc/
PK6K-24BH.
366. JAMES RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS: THE MAKING OF THE NEXT GLOBAL CRISIS 3–16
(2012).
367. Javers, supra note 365.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. DELOITTE, THIS IS NOT A TEST: HOW SIMULATIONS AND WARGAMING CAN HELP YOU
MANAGE BUSINESS RISK AND MAKE DECISIONS IN A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT 7 (2013), available
at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Consulting/
us_cons_thisisnotatest_05102013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6M8C-X8JZ.
371. Deloitte Acquires King’s Wargaming Outfit, CONTINUITY INS. & RISK ONLINE (Feb. 23,
2010), http://www.cirmagazine.com/cir/deloitte-acquires-kings-wargaming-outfit.php, archived
at http://perma.cc/DVA6-53PB.
372. DELOITTE, supra note 370, at 3.
373. Id.
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firms and understand how one firm’s vulnerabilities can affect the
system. For example, the possible failure of the insurer AIG, which
was not overseen by any banking regulators, threatened to collapse the
entire financial system because AIG had insured trillions of
derivatives for almost every large financial institution. 374 Regulators
must be able to see the system as a whole to understand what risks
threaten it. Similarly, when the military conducts a war game of a
potential Syrian strike, they must include players representing
Iranian, Russian, Chinese, and Israeli interests to fully understand
and prepare for each nation’s potential response to an attack and
prepare for all those contingencies.
If regulators are committed to using hypotheticals to inform
their efforts, they must ensure that the results account for all
variables, especially human decisionmaking. Financial war games are
one way to do so. What would such an exercise look like? Borrowing
from the Pentagon’s playbook, regulators would invite experts in the
field to assume a role in the financial sector. The regulators would then
model a financial stressor or firm failure, and each party would react
to protect their own interests. The resulting data would be aggregated
to provide an accurate understanding of the vulnerabilities of the
system as a whole and each individual firm.
The players could be representatives from the actual firms or
industry experts who could vicariously play their roles. (Ratings
agencies, insurers, and regulators should also play a role.) Both choices
have advantages and flaws: using experts, and not firm insiders,
minimizes the risk of insiders trying to game the game. In other words,
insiders with reputations to protect might behave in a more altruistic
manner than they would behave in a real world situation. For example,
in the event of counterparty failure, a firm might engage in
opportunistic behavior that would accelerate a counterparty’s failure
or cause damage to other firms. But the insiders might not display this
sort of behavior in a low-stakes simulation. In contrast, experts who
are not repeat market players and have no reputational concerns
would take actions that actually reflect those made in real crises. The
downside of outside experts, however, is that they are unable to mimic
or portray the culture of a firm, and as stated above, culture has a lot
to do with how decisions are made.

374. Gregory Gethard, Falling Giant: A Case Study of AIG, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 25, 2009),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/american-investment-group-aig-bailout.asp,
archived at http://perma.cc/BX6V-T6FB.
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C. Challenges of Financial War Games
The principal challenge to financial war gaming is that even a
realistic war game simulation needs to use hypothetical situations
based on historical data to determine risk exposure. As illustrated
above, hypothetical models of any sort have serious and irremediable
structural flaws. Carefully conducted war games have the potential to
produce more, and more accurate, information than a balance sheet–
based stress test, but they do not cure the faulty assumptions of the
hypothetical regime. 375 For example, a war game needs prompts and
assumptions—or stress. And in devising prompts, regulators would
still be using yesterday’s crisis to imagine the future and would be just
as unaware of black swans or unprecedented events with catastrophic
market consequences.
Furthermore, the simulations would be susceptible to
gamesmanship by the players and might not accurately reflect firm
response to financial stressors. Just as regulators’ incentives to instill
trust in the financial system might lead them to administer “soft”
stress tests, so might a firm trying to instill confidence in their
creditors, counterparties, and supervisors depict a rosier picture than
is accurate. In addition to the problems with war games’ effectiveness,
they are also more costly to administer than stress tests. In addition
to the expense associated with the creation and administration of
hypothetical models, which is where stress tests stop, war games
involve more human power—namely, more experts and industry
insiders. However, these costs can easily be justified if they can help
prevent firm failure. In addition, if war games exposed more (and more
severe) firm weaknesses than stress testing, they would be more useful
in designing future regulation. However, unfortunately, war games
would thwart the FRB’s market-calming objectives.
IV. CONCLUSION
As banking has changed over the last century, regulators
responded using a variety of regulatory tools to protect the safety of
the banking system. Before the era of banking deregulation, regulators
used bright-line rules and restrictions. These restrictions could not
survive the transformation of banking that occurred during the 1970s
and1980s. The financial world grew larger and more complex, and

375. War games are not just another version of hypothetical scenarios. FRANK PARTNOY,
WAIT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DELAY 70–76, 125–26, 218–24 (2013) (describing military and
chess decision making).
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regulators met these changes with more market- and industry-driven
regulation. Many argued that activity restrictions and geographic
restrictions prohibited banks from competing in the modern financial
world. Regulators needed to find a way to ensure safety while allowing
banks to stay competitive. Thus, the disclosure, capital, and risk
management regimes were born. The disclosure regime was based on
the theory that, if banks shared enough information with the market,
the market would discipline excessive risk taking or mismanagement.
The capital regime was thought of as a way to incentivize banks to
decrease risk by putting more of their own equity on the line and
provide a buffer in the event of failure. The risk management regime
was an industry-led effort to account for risk in a complex and fastchanging market. Banks used the tools of risk management to estimate
their vulnerabilities. Regulators oversaw the creation and
administration of these models but mainly relied on bankers
themselves to design and implement these internal programs.
The recent financial crisis made clear that the current menu of
modern regulation had failed. The disclosure system did not work
because the market was unable to account for the actual risks, and
rating agencies and other monitors of information were unable to
synthesize the information the banks were disclosing. Capital
requirements came up short under conditions that caused a rapid
depletion of capital across the entire financial sector. And risk models
had not accounted for unprecedented or “black swan” events, such as a
steep nationwide decline in housing prices. In the wake of these events,
many commentators have demanded more capital, more disclosure,
and better risk management to improve regulatory oversight.
This Article highlights a new strain of financial regulation
introduced by Dodd-Frank: regulation by hypothetical. Two of DoddFrank’s pillars—stress tests and living wills—use hypothetical future
scenarios to test firms’ current positions. The FRB creates these
hypotheticals using historical data and tests firms’ current balance
sheets in light of possible adverse scenarios. The new hypothetical
regime is an extension of the risk management regime, but differs from
risk management because regulation by hypothetical is designed and
implemented by regulators and the hypothetical test results are used
to inform formal regulatory responses.
The hypothetical regime, as currently practiced, suffers from
several problems. If these problems are left unremedied, they will pose
grave dangers to market stability. Like the tools of the risk
management regime, the testing mechanisms of regulation by
hypothetical will fail if they remain focused on historical data and
events. In addition, these mechanisms, as now conceived, test a static
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balance sheet but not a firm’s dynamic response. Not only is it unlikely
that currently employed tests can accurately diagnose a firm’s
vulnerability to future events, but it is also likely that these tests cause
affirmative harms. In particular, they may signal to the public a
greater measure of financial-sector stability than exists in reality. This
result, which in effect embodies a form of government subsidy to the
banking industry, is especially troubling in light of the many subsidies
that the industry already receives.
The bottom line is that these tests must be either abandoned as
a regulatory tool or significantly enhanced. One way to pursue the
latter course of action is for regulators to design financial war games.
Such an exercise would allow regulators to test not just firms’ balance
sheets but also the firms’ responses to potential disasters. Henry
Paulson described the quickly unfolding financial crisis of 2008 as “the
financial equivalent of a war,” 376 and certainly it thrust the banking
industry into the financial equivalent of the “fog of war.” The next
crisis will likely unfold like a war as well. Thus, regulators should plan
accordingly.

376. James B. Stewart, The Eight Days of the Financial Crisis, NEW YORKER, Sept, 21, 2009,
available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/21/090921fa_fact_stewart.
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